'Extracts from Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia by J G Lorimer CIE, Indian Civil Service' [‎20v] (45/180)

30
Dissatisfac
tion of the
Government
of Bombay
with the
terms
arranged.
and last article provided for the adherence from time to time of fresh signatories
The Government of Bombay From c. 1668-1858, the East India Company’s administration in the city of Bombay [Mumbai] and western India. From 1858-1947, a subdivision of the British Raj. It was responsible for British relations with the Gulf and Red Sea regions. , though they highly commended his conduct of
the military operations and appreciated the humane motives that inspired his policy,
were disappointed at the leniency of General Grant Keir s settlement, and desired,
if it were not too late, to introduce some conditions ol greater stringency. In their
opinion the more guilty of the Shaikhs should have been removed from their
positions of authority, other local chiefs being substituted for them or their
possessions transferred to the Saiyid ot Masqat, while those who had actually fallen
into the hands of the force should have been detained m custody, the release of
Husain-bin-'Ali was particularly regretted. The* treaty ought to have interdicted
the fitting out of armed vessels at ports hitherto piratical, to have limited the size
of the vessels employed in commerce; to have stipulated for powers of search
and confiscation by the British authorities in order to enforce these conditions; to
have provided for a restriction of the export of ship-timber from India, and to
have forbidden the construction of fortifications in certain circumstances, at the
same time empowering the British Government to enter on and destroy any
that might be built in disregard of the prohibition. In the view ot the Bombay
Government the treaty, as it stood, afforded no guarantee against the renewal
of piracy except one of an illusory character depending on the institution of ships
papers, and was so drafted that breach of its conditions would not render he
culprits liable to any punishment that might not equally have been inflicted in the
absence of a treaty. . • j u * + i ,
To these strictures Sir W. Grant Keir made a spirited but temperate reply.
He explained that if, instead of accepting the voluntary submission of the hostile
chiefs, he had attempted to enforce extreme measures against them, it would have
been necessary for him, in contravention oi his instructions, to have pursued them
into the interior; and that, if others had been substituted in their place, the British
Government, committed to the support of their own nominees, would have become
entangled in local affairs. The minor stipulations which it was desired to insert
in the treaty might, he conceived, be enforced at any time when a necessity for
them should arise, for they would be in harmony with the general spirit and objects
of the treaty, which were perfectly well understood by the Arabs. In his opinion,
any condition which obliged the boats of particular ports to put to sea unarmed
would make in incumbent on the British Government to protect them from
the attacks of their enemies; and the export of ship-timber from India appeared
to him to be a question of the internal regulations of that country, to which it
was unnecessary to refer in a treaty with the Qawasim One of the ruling families of the United Arab Emirates; also used to refer to a confederation of seafaring Arabs led by the Qāsimī tribe from Ras al Khaima. . But the principal argument
of Sir W. Grant Keir was that, though a treaty might be entered into with tne
Qawasim One of the ruling families of the United Arab Emirates; also used to refer to a confederation of seafaring Arabs led by the Qāsimī tribe from Ras al Khaima. to restore confidence, " any measure calculated to secure their retorm
must have its foundation in power," and that reliance must be P la ced, not on the
binding power of any agreement, but rather on the moral effect of the defeat whicn
the tribe had sustained, and on prompt and effective action by the naval and
military force which it was the intention of the Honourable Company to maintain
for the future in the Gulf. By the treaty death and forfeiture were declared to be
the penalty of piratical crimes, and, such being the case, it could not be said
that the treaty failed to render punishable the violation of its own terms.
In the end, though in certain respects the views of the Bombay Government
remained unaltered, the settlement as arranged upon the spot was allowed to
stand; and subsequent events proved the policy of Sir William Grant Keir to have
been no less judicious than it was liberal.
PERIOD FROM THE GENERAL TREATY OF PEACE TO THE FIRST
MARITIME TRUCE, 1820-35.
Arrangements for the repression of piracy after the expedition, 1820-23.
Views of In despatching a force against Ras-al-Khaimah the Government of Bombay From c. 1668-1858, the East India Company’s administration in the city of Bombay [Mumbai] and western India. From 1858-1947, a subdivision of the British Raj. It was responsible for British relations with the Gulf and Red Sea regions.
the Bombay had not, as already shown, lost sight of the fact that, whatever immediate success
Government might attend the expedition, further measures of a more permanent character
* In the objections referred to in this sentence we seem to discover the influence of
Mr. Warden. (See footnote, page 659.) [P. 22 of these Extracts.]