'Report on Najd Mission 1917-1918' [‎12v] (24/60)

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of tlie commercial development of his country. When at last, in 1914, he
found himself in a position to turn his attention to this subject and his finan
cial needs made it imperative for him to cast about for ways and means of
improving his revenues, his eyes turned to the Hasa ports, the development
of which, as the normal avenues of Najdean commerce, became his immediate
ambition.
At this point, the outbreak of the war and the consequent restriction of
shipping dashed his hopes to the ground and, with a good enough grace, he
has recognized that the British Government was unable, for the time being,
to forward his plans by the provision of shipping.
Nevertheless, he has never lost sight of the matter and, when blockade
difficulties arose at Kuwait, he saw in them a good reason for pressing his-
claims for the recognition of his own ports. Meanwhile he was suffering a
loss of customs revenue, which he could ill afford. Goods, arriving at
Bahrain for through export to Najd, are liable to customs duty at that port
without rebate or refund on proof of re-export and, though Ibn Sand collects
customs duty at 8 per cent on goods landed at the Hasa ports, the double
tax constitutes a serious deterrent against the use of the Bahrain route. At
Kuwait matters are still worse, so far as Ibn Saud is concerned, in that, while
all goods landed at that port, whether for transit to the interior or not, pay
customs dues to the Shaikh of Kuwait, it is impossible under present condi
tions or indeed under any conditions for Ibn Saud to arrange a customs
cordon on the land side for the collection of dues—he thus collects nothing
on goods imported into his territories via Kuwait and, such goods being
subject to a single tariff, the port of Kuwait enjoys extraordinary advantages
over the Hasa ports in respect of inland trade.
It is obvious that, after the war, Ibn Saud, who has now firmly estab
lished his rule through the length and breadth of Xajd, including the Qasim,
will not continue to suffer the loss of so much revenue with equanimity; and
the alternatives open to him will be either to offer lower rates and other
facilities in respect of imports direct to the Hasa ports, whose revenues would
How entirely into his coffers, or to enter into mutually satisfactory tariff
arrangements with the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Kuwait, whereby a reasonable
percentage of the customs revenue of those ports would be paid to himself.
In view of the very rapid growth of the standard of living in Central
Arabia in recent years, during which money has poured into the country,
more particularly from the west, and of the heavy demands for piece-goods,
foodstuffs and other commodities likely to ensue during the coming era of
peace, this question of the trade of Najd and the reasonable division of profits
arising therefrom is one, which deserves the serious attention of H.M. s
Government. In this place it is not possible to do more than to state the
problem in its simplest aspect.
12. Ihn Sand's Operations against Hail.
At the end of October, 1917, the military situation in Central Arabia was
extremely obscure. Since the death of Captain Shakespear at the battle of
Jarrab in January, 1915, Ibn Saud, left to his own resources, had failed to
continue the campaign then interrupted at its inception. The impetus given >
to his flagging zeal by the conversations of 1916, backed by the grant of a
regular subsidy and a substantial addition to his armament, was spent without
any substantial result. Ibn Rashid was known to have left his capital and to
be with the Turks at A1 Hajar, near Madain Salih, on the Hijaz railway,
while his confidential agent, Ibn Laila, had gone to Damascus presumably to
consult the Turkish High Command regarding his master's affairs. Hail was
left to the care of its garrison under the command of a trusted slave. Finally,
Ibn Saud, according to his own account, had been maintaining pressure on
Jabal Shammar, watching for an opportunity to strike, until the beginning of
Ramdhan, when he resigned the command of the forces in the Qasim to his
son, Turki, and returned to his capital. Turki had effected nothing and was
not likely to do so.
Meanwhile the Sharif's denunciations of Ibn Saud's lukewarmness in the
allied cause were becoming more frequent and uncompromising, as well as
more difficult to refute on behalf of our ally, and the High Commissioner for
Egypt voiced the opinion of all authorities concerned, when he expressed the
hope that " time and the successful completion of the Mission, resulting, it
is hoped, in active aggression against the Turks on the part of Ibn Saud would
prove to the King the folly of his present policy of suspicion and the wisdom of
effecting a reconciliation with his nearest powerful neighbour."
The principal object of the Najd Mission was, therefore, to launch Ibn
Saud into a campaign of active aggression against the Turks, which I inter
preted, for all practical purposes, as meaning a campaign against Ibn Rashid
# with the capture of Hail as its chief objective, and it may be assumed that
Government neither intended nor desired that Ibn Saud should be committed
to such a venture with inadequate resources at his disposal. It was indeed
to obviate such a contingency, that a responsible military officer was attached