‘GAZETTEER OF PERSIA VOL. I Comprising the Provinces of ASTARÁBÁD, SHÁHRUD-BÚSTAN, KHÚRÁSÁN, AND SÍSTÁN’ [‎254r] (514/722)

as exempt from suffering, in a direct manner, from the tyrannical
exercise of the personal authority of the monarch of that country. Their
lives and property are generally secure, unless under the sentence of the
law ; and though their judges and magistrates can impose tines, inflict
corporal punishment, and sentence to death, they have no power of
directing landed property of inheritance to be seized or alienated, unless
for the satisfaction of creditors ; and we cannot have a better proof of the
security of private estates than a knowledge that during the latter
years of the Safavian dynasty, land sold for 25 and 30 years' pur
chase ; and that all the late revolutions which have afflicted Persia, and
the heavy imposts that have been laid upon the inhabitants of that country,
have never reduced it below one-half of its former value.
The king nominates whomsoever he pleases to be governors of prov
inces and principal collectors of the revenue ; but a military tribe will only
obey a leader who belongs to the family of their chiefs, and the king is
not always able to interrupt the regular succession. When he appoints,
or, more properly speaking, supports a chief, who is disagreeable to the
tribe, their violent discontent and insubordination often compel him to
revoke the measure he has adopted. The principal magistrates of cities,
who act under the governor, and those appointed to preside over different
wards, must, as has been before stated, not only be natives of the city, but
persons who are agreeable to the majority of the inhabitants. These
officers, therefore, and the magistrates of towns and of villages, may almost
be said to be elective. The effect of this system is to render the situation
of the magistrate of a town like that of the chief of a tribe ; and we often
find that it is hereditary in a particular family. A magistrate so chosen
may occasionally bend before a storm he cannot resist, and become an
instrument of tyranny and oppression ; but all his natural feelings, and
the interest of himself and his successors, must dispose him to use what
power he has for the protection of his fellow-citizens ; and the custom,
therefore, which grants to the inhabitants of Persia this right of influenc
ing the nomination of their immediate superiors is very effective in pre
serving them from some of the worst evils of a despotic rule. This privi
lege, as has been mentioned, is extended to all the principal tradesmen
and artisans of Persia. In every great city each class has its head, whom
the general voice has raised to that condition; and through this person
all particular imposts laid down upon the trade or manufacture to which
the party belongs are paid, while all grievances are represented through
the same channel.
There is no country in which men enjoy more personal freedom in
regard to their place of residence than in Persia. All ranks except those
in public service, or slaves (who are not numerous), may go where they
choose within the kingdom, or leave it whenever they desire to do so.
There is no passport required. The government never offer any obstruction
to an individual following his own inclination in this particular ; and the
facility with which men can remove from the effects of tyranny may be
deemed one of their securities against its oppression.
W^e have already stated that the confusion which prevails in Persia,
between the courts of ‘ shara' and ‘ urf/ or ‘ written' and ‘ customary law/
has been purposely promoted, not only by the monarch, but all those who
enjoy power. It is a great source of illicit emolument ; for in cases of dis
pute (except on points expressly limited to the decision of the written
law), the favour of the king, or of those civil or military officers who are