Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎90r] (179/348)

can be offered. Indeed, we hear of a spirit of depression prevailing at Athens
when the real nature of the retirement came to be understood. This feeling will
grow as winter draws on.
The attitude .of the Constantinople Government is a less important factor, but
it is perhaps significant that on the 23rd September Sir H. Rumbold reported that
Tewfik Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , the Grand Vizier, had at a recent Cabinet reviewed the situation in
Asia Minor as a stalemate, and stated that he had advocated in recent conversa
tions with diplomatists at Constantinople the retention of Thrace by Greece,
together with certain concessions in Smyrna, conditional on the imnjediate
evacuation of Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. . He added that the time had come to approach the Allies
officially. The more Nationalist members of the Cabinet had protested on the
ground that Angora must make the first move. Tewfik’s move was believed to be
inspired by the Sultan, and possibly to herald changes in the Cabinet in
a direction unfavourable to the Kemalists. This, however, has not followed.
Meanwhile we know the Constantinople Government to be in close touch with
Angora through the Constantinople Minister for Foreign Affairs, Izzet Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. .
As regards the situation at Angora, our reports do not encourage any very
sanguine hopes as to Angora’s readiness for peace. One thing seems clear,
however, namely, that, in spite of some hostile symptoms, the nationalist move
ment, with Mustapha Kemal either as dictator or figurehead, has a real hold in
Asia Minor. It also seems probable that there is really not much difference of
opinion in principle between the various parties at Angora, beyond personal
jealousies, and that the pre-war C.U.P. elements have created a fairly strong
centralised and comparatively efficient Government, of a military kind. These
points were emphasised at the Foreign Office the other day by Dr. White, an
American missionary of long experience, who has seen much of Kemalist Turkey
and only recently left it.
On the other hand, the material resources of the Kemalists cannot be strong.
The shortage of ammunition, motors and petrol has already been noted. The
recent forcible requisition of 40 per cent, of all stocks in Asia Minor was also
significant. If intelligence reports may be trusted, a recent decision first to ask
the Bolsheviks for labour and later for cavalry, and the removal of all troops from
the Caucasus and Cilicia fronts show exhausted man-power. The same reports,
confirmed by Dr. White, go to show that although the Russians have undoubtedly
helped with arms and ammunition and offered but not delivered warships, the
Kemalists regard Bolshevik agents and Bolshevik designs with no small suspicion,
while the Bolsheviks hardly conceal their intention of recovering Kars and
Sarykamish at the earliest opportunity. The “manage de convenance ’ with the
Bolsheviks, in short, seems unlikely to weigh strongly with the Kemalists at the
moment if they thought that they could obtain acceptable terms from the Allies.
Unfortunately it is very hard even to guess what their terms would be to-day.
Before the Greek offensive of last July there was very little indication that the
Kemalists would modify appreciably in negotiations the terms of the National
Pact of February 1921, which, as it is so often referred to, I am printing at the
close of this Memorandum. These terms, though admittedly susceptible of
modification in detail in the course of negotiation, differ very materially from the
Treaty of Sevres even as afterwards proposed to be modified in London and Paris.
On the other hand, the indication of Kemalist terms communicated to us at
the end of July by Mr. Toynbee, the correspondent of the “ Manchester Guardian,
who has transferred his sympathies from the Greeks to the Turks, showed a certain
willingness to interpret the Pact more reasonably, especially in the matter of the
Capitulations and finance, and possibly in the case of the Straits. That was,
however, before the Greek retreat, and there was no sign of any abandonment of
the Pact’s territorial provisions—retention of Smyrna and Thrace.
Since the Greek retreat, however, there has been some indication that Angora
might be willing to accept intervention, though probably on her own terms.
First, a telegram from Angora to Constantinople of the 12th September showed
an inclination to turn negotiations about prisoners into negotiations for peace,
and the Japanese High Commissioner, who had offered to intervene, was
informed that the object of the National Assembly was to secure a peace
guaranteeing the liberty and independence of the Turkish nation within its
frontiers, and if the British Government would admit and concede these
legitimate aims, they would be ready to start negotiations at once.
On the other hand, there can be little doubt what the legitimate frontiers of
Turkey, as interpreted by the Kemalists, are. On the 21st September Sir H.