File 705/1916 Pt 1 'Arab revolt: reports' [‎296v] (140/494)

the Tiban delile
It
2. To advance to Lahej and command the outlets from
3. To occupy Dala, and reach the old frontier line.
4. To occupy Taiz, thus assuming a Protectorate over all S.\Y\ Yemen.
In the case of any of the first three, it would be almost necessary to
occupy Sheikh Said.
With regard to these alternatives : —
(1) In the future, even more than in the past, it will be found impossible
to regard Aden as an isolated post disconnected with the
Hinterland.
(2) The Sheikh Othman position has military drawbacks, and its
occupation is politically ineffective. Laiiej would be a good
position to hold, offering a wide radius of action for troops, being-
well placed both for controlling the coast Arabs and for blocking
the approaches to Aden. Further, Lahej is closer to Aden than any
other centre at which a hostile force could collect for an attack upon
Aden.
^ There are convenient positions near Lahej, e.g., at A1 Anad and
Tannan from which three or four battalions with guns could deny
the approach to Lahej of a much superior force. The chief
disadvantage of the scheme, i.e,, the presence of mosquitoes, is
balanced by the fertility of the district.
(o) Dala would provide a sanatorium for Aden troops; but it is o
r strategical importance, and is regarded as not worth any risk.
(4) The occupation of Taiz appears the most attractive proposition. Xl
is a big scheme, and would require a permanent force of a division.
It would necessitate too the carrying on of the railway from Aden
to Taiz; and it might entail trouble with the Imam of'Yemen, but
vmuld be viewed favourably by the Idrisi, to whom some coast land
could be offered. The climate is very good. The place is of great
strategic value, for the new frontier would be naturally defensible
and any force placed there would be well placed for use in Persia’
India, East Africa, the Red Sea coast, or the West. The trade of
all the Yemen would be greatly increased under a stable
government.
This m the opinion of the General Officer Commanding, Aden is the
least advance that should be made. It is noteworthy that his decision
preceded the Sheriffs revolt which has put the Lahej Turks in a difficult and
isolated position.
^n e i Stl0n ° f Lalu ' J ' raises the ( l uestion Sheikh Said, for it is thomdit
that it will be necessary to occupy the latter if it is decided not to advance
beyond the former, for Sheikh Said dominates the Bab-Al-Mandab Straits •
^ f J ° + uld Vrovide a natural defence for Perim. Water there is very scarce’
ano it is an undesirable spot for troops, but if the Hejaz railway reaches
embo on the coast and outflanks the Suez Canal its potential importance
aml ^ unwise to allow it ^
T P ;1 !‘7 TlliS r ? P ? rt wa ® written before the Sheriffs revolt cut off the
Turkish force at Lahej. I here need be no fear of offendirm the Imam of
Yemen, who has shown himself entirely unreliable and treacherous and has
lately been giving constant assistance to the Turks In fact ‘ L .
=d, h r„ d “ , "'“~ M "• - JS&'sfrjs
SINAI AND SYRIA.
and SiS Iff tL* middle orffn -’ 01 The ’ 00 ' 1 enemy “'gP" 1,1 Soutliern Syria
distributed as follows L Y e ’ to agents’ reports.
Advanced Troops:— ^<>rth Road.
Salmana - _ -
Bir El Mazar . ' ' . L'!
El A risk - . ' -.SOO