File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎199v] (396/450)

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appear to be a somewhat serious point—that a large number of Arabs were still with
the Turkish Medina force, and that others had left Sherif Faisal because they got food
with the Turks and little with the Arabs.
As far as^ I can gather the Sherif expects the British Government to supply the A
whole of his force in the ilejaz, and possibly part of the population with foodstuffs. *
If the Sherif s view is correct, the urgency of getting large quantities of supplies ready
at f^nce is clearly indicated and of the first importance ; further demands for munitions
of war may also be expected.
I have no knowledge as to what extent the British Government encouraged the
Sherif to revolt, nor as to how far it is committed, but it is obvious that if any respon
sibility has been incurred the Sherif should receive the fullest possible support now,
half measures may easily mean disaster and future trouble.
should a British representative be appointed as recommended above, I suggest that
supplies should be collected at Jeddah, where he would issue them as required, and
not send to Port Sudan, which would entail an extra loading and unloading ; should
be nb such representative, Port Sudan, as a supply depot, is preferable to Suez, as
the Sherif s dhows could be utilised for transport purposes. If the depot is at Jeddah, a
trained storekeeper and clerk will be necessary.
I wo cargo steamers of about 3,000 tons, or at least one, should be detailed at once
for transport of supplies work only.
The Sherif appears, at present, anyhow, to be inclined to resent any British inter
ference though this is possibly due to his fear that the Arabs should think that they
had exchanged British for Turkish rule, &c., and the general situation requires careful
handling owing to the intrigues among the Sherif s own people.
Captain Cornwallis informed me that when he was ashore with Sherif Faruki he
looked into a cafe now used as a genera] hospital, and although he was only inside a
matter of seconds, Sherif Faruki was furious at his entering the place at alh Again
one ^ evening Sherif Faruki informed Captain Cornwallis that instructions had been
received from the Sherif to the effect that no one was allowed ashore, and that
communications were to be carried on in writing. Captain Cornwallis and I refused
to accept such an_ order unless we received it in writing from the Sherif.
. AfP" 1 ” a certain amount of argument, it was agreed that Captain Cornwallis, the
Senior JNaval Officer, and myself could go ashore when necessary on business; we
ascertained afterwards, and I have no reason to doubt its truth, that"Sherif Faruki’had
enlarged on the Grand Sheriffs orders on his own account. All that the Sherif wished
was that parties from the ships, &c., should not land. Considering the state of Jeddah
and the fact that Bamadan had begun, I did not consider that any objection could be
taken to this, if the Sherif considered that there was any chance of a disturbance.
follow a l ° W ° f n ° British intervention at a11 would, I submit, be an impossible line to
The British Government should insist on an agent, as recommended above, being
at Jeddah and on its being kept fully informed, through him, as to all movements and
intentions of the Sherif s forces and on the Sheriffs taking advice should such be deemed
necessary, more particularly with regard to the administration of Jeddah.
The British Agent would take no active part in Jeddah administration, but would
give his advice as occasion arose. The Grand Sherif should be instructed (or requested)
o inform ms local representatives at Jeddah that, in regard to quarantine, sanitary,
and such like matters, they should consult freely and accept the advice of the British
Agent. Great care must, of course, be taken in so wording such requests to the
Grand Sheiif as to allay any exciting fears that the British Government intend to take
over the administration of Jeddah entirely and actively interfere with the adminis
tration of the Hejaz, to do either, especially at present, would be a great mistake
politically, and that we have no such intention should be made clear to the Grand
bherif.
Assuming that the Grand Sheriff is informed on the lines indicated above, on the
grounds that the British Government must insist—in the Sheriffs own interests—that
Jeddah shouM be properly run and the advice of its agent taken, the method of getting
things done might well be left to the latter, who will not have an easy problem to solve
and whose position will not be a “ bed of roses.”
It might usefully be pointed out to the Grand Sherif that, should an epidemic
occur m Jeddah, the fact will be proclaimed and the Pilgrimage and ordinary shipping
and trade intercourse—which is so much desired by him—will be greatly interfered
with.
I am inclined to go so far as to recommend offering the Sherif to supply him with
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