'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎96v] (197/294)

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CHAPTER 15
0FPSKSI7E ACTION
GENERAL
The objects of Offensive Action
Offensive action was generally undertaken with one or more of thr
objects in vieW:-
(a) The capture of ams or of "wanted” men.
(b) The punishment of inhabitants of villages or town quarters.
(c) The destruction of armed bands.
All three of course overlapped considerably. A search for arms
might often be carried out in order to act as a punishment in itself;
while every type of offensive action had always the ultimate aim of
bringing armed bands to action by making them fight to stop embarrassing
activities on the part of the military. Thus the more troops could
act offensively by moving constantly over the country searching villages
and driving areas, the more chance they had of encountering the bands
and ini dieting casualties upon them. Even activities of this kind which
did not result in any contact with armed rebels did at least keep them
on the run and at the same time made the inhabitants more chary of
assisting them. The results of offensive action therefore cannot
properly be assessed in numbers of arms captured, of arrests made, or even
of casualties inflicted; but should be regarded more in the light of
the cumulative effect over a period of time. If more troops had been
released Irom static defence to act offensively and had they been able
to make a freer use of their weapons from the beginning, there is no
doub u that both the concrete results and the ultimate effect would have
been very much greater. As it was the principal aim was never achieved,
m tnat the rebellion closed with the main bands still intact and under
armo, so that the "subjugation of the hostile elements" was never in
fact accomplished.
_l e requ-Lrements of successful of fen s i ve ac t i o n
The first of these requirements - as in the case of successful
defensive action - was surprise, and in acting offensively there was
r^ ner a better ^chance of securing it. But it needed every ounce of
cunning, coupled with rigorous avoidance of anything resembling routine
procedure, and a good knowledge of the habits of the enemy. Ibr instance
the Arao liked to get his regular hours of sleep and would usually
re l 111 ’ 10 '' 00n oer ^dnight, relying for the remainder of the night
on ne village dogs to warn him of approaching danger. A cautious
a yance snortiy before dawn therefore stood a good chance of catching
villages off their guard, and furthermore forced any band to fight for
the longest possible time before being able to cloak its retreat with
usuall y 311 essential ingredient in rebel plans. In an open
ig surprise could oest be effected by wide enveloping movements
designed to take the enemy in the rear. He usually succeeded in slipping
/ay m time to evade the force of a frontal or flank attack, but was
of uen careless about covering his rear and even if the rear attack did
retr^t^ e > teGted - 1 u S ^ diSG0Very was often flayed long enough for the
retreat to be punished heavily. & ^