'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎94v] (193/294)

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under his command. His responsibilities were limited within the
boundaries of land owned by the Railways, which gave him the ta^k
looking after the permanent why but not of preventing rebels from ° f
firing upon it, ^he lacker rems.ined ohe care of the area commands'
so long as they operated from Outside the narrow strip of crmn-na rS
flanking the line. ^ a
By July it had become necessary to add considerably to the Sure-
numary Police guards on bridges and railway stations, and the South/'
Area commander had found it necessary to establish picquets to nrev/+
sniping of the line between Artuf and Jerusalem. At the end of th/
month the 8 th Hussars at Gaza started to use car patrols to assist thp
Che shires, and at the same time six anti-aircraft searchlights were
distributed between Gaza and Tulkarm. On the 8 th August a most
successful innovation was introduced, whereby light Ford V .8 pilot
trolleys were run in the same section ahead of passenger trains in
daylight. Meanwhile two naval armoured trains had been put into
commission, and in early September an additional company of infantry
was placed under the L, of C. Commander,
0 A lth thS h ri I al ° f the Emer S e " 0 y Force in October it was possible
to ^dd a second infantry battalion (2nd Battalion The South Wales
Borderers) to the "Railway Protection Troops", as they were now known
Picquetting under the arrangements of area commanders was increased-
o-nd plans were afoot to build blockhouses for the bridge guards, who
b h en f r0m tents int0 trenches. The last fL Ss had
seen the ghaffirs change to Supernumary Police, the shot-guns give
strength^Pin^ 1 ? h StS inorease in bot h numbers and individual
had the ^ trenches T, o uld have given place to blockhouses
a
The Lessons of Railway
protection^as'largely 6 ” ^Vr^triaT' deVel0pm ! nt ° f railT ^
it mav have matoer of fcria l a nd error: at first sight
technical knowledge^ but^thr^thr 011 ’ 11 ^ 6 ^ methods and rauch
much the same as in the case of th^ the conclusions to be drawn are
communications. in Palestine^ r °M S °p mos t ot her types of
smallest number n-p " n6 ^ rob - 1 - em throughout was to make the
the perioHome W t S % th \ lon S^ W- For the greater part of
number bfpoSce hS ^ “ ed S ° ldiers “ d half that
it was in order to do +>, - 6 (; Jr ® ad across the 242 miles of railway, and
tection by patrols was evolved 1 ’ th ® rath ® r . c o m P li o a tea system of pro
successful in maintaining - rehl-^ J y . proved to be entirel y
rebellion with verv inhh regular tram service all through the
became available in greater ^trenfftb^+^^b 11 ’ but ° nCe tr oops
method. Bv October 1 " t; ceased to be the most effective
Supern^ariL^ere tr ?° PS SeV6ral “ ed
specialised duties, not ell under tv railwa y a variety of somewhat
like six men to a ikle i/wou^ / comander * something
of posts (picquets or b*i il ? ve been Possible to start a chain
they would afford protection 0 ^//1 thr °^f hOUt . the line at 3iteS Wher0
bridges, etc. From the^e ^ - 4 - able points such as stations,,
pemanent way by making us ////^ 13 ° n f ° 0t could S uard the
for patrols in trolleys^ an 8 tr- • OUrpri n e measures which were impossible
be sited near the military post/Zh-i// ng ?? Sts ° f P latela y ers could
platelayers, in themselve^ an /dditior the escorts f ° r fc?
should be manned by troous -nrl -vv t v 1 f ° m of P atro1 * ^ ich P ost
other cases, entirely U non r n ' Ch hy P oll ce must depend, as in all
Of police ought S Tbern ^ 3
place. * xcuse for employing troops in their