'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎51r] (101/248)

PAM XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT 99
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.
B. Faulty Organisation of Indian Military Administration.
he might have to face opposition from the Finance Member. The Army Member would then pass his orders.
If he adhered to the scheme as put forward by the Quartermaster-General and the Army Department he would
record a note to that effect. The file would then go back to the Financial Adviser, and the latter -would not
note again, but would submit the case to the Finance Member. If the Finance Member decided not to press
the objections raised by Mr. Fell, the proposal would become a fully accepted proposal, and orders would
be issued for putting it into effect. If, however, the Finance Member definitely objected to the scheme, the
case would then go back to Mr. Fell for return to the Army Secretary for re-submission to the Army Member.
The Army Member might then defer to the Finance Member’s objection, in which case the whole proposal
would be dropped with the Army Member's concurrence, though a reluctant concurrence. If, however, the
Army Member, in spite of the Finance Member’s objections, considered that the proposal was a necessary one,
he would intimate to the Army Secretary that the case should be referred to His Excellency the Viceroy, under
our Rides of Business, which prescribe that when two members of Council differ, the case must be referred for
the orders of the Viceroy. The Army Secretary would then lay the case before the Viceroy. The latter might
very possibly indicate a personal opinion that in the circumstances, as a particular case he thought it perhaps
desirable that the views of the Army Member should be deferred to, and any expression of the Viceroy’s wish
in an ordinary case is very frequently—I might almost say generally—deferred to. Or the \iceroy might,
pursuing the ordinary procedure under our Statutory Rules of Business, simply instruct the Army Secretary
that the case was to be brought up in Council the following week. It would then be discussed in Council,
the Army Secretary being present, but not taking any part in the discussion, and would be settled by the
views of the majority of the Council.
Asked how long a disputed case might take, he replied :—
At the best a disputed proposal would, I think, ordinarily take a good many weeks. I cannot put it
more exactly than that, but a great deal depends upon whether the responsible secretary takes a grip of the
case and prevents its being constantly remitted backwards and forwards between the Financial Adviser on
the one side and the Administrative Authority, the Quartermaster-General, or whoever he may be, on the other,
inviting each in turn to reply to the other's rejoinders and criticisms. Where a case was not taken hold of and
put to an end, I have known it very lamentably protracted from this cause, but it is always within the power
of the Army Secretary, at any time when a case reaches him on its perambulations, to say that it has been
sufficiently discussed, and to take it up at once for the Orders of the Army Member and that should be done
after reasonable opportunity for meeting new criticisms has been given.
* It was admitted by him that during the perambulations of this proposal, the
Commander-in-Chief played little or no part. When further asked if this procedure
would apply to any proposal for an increase of equipment—say, machine guns— he
replied :—
It would apply equally well, but the procedure would be somewhat more cumbersome, because instead
of our only having the Quartermaster-General’s branch to deal with, it would probably involve also the General
Staff, the Adjutant-General, and the Ordnance Department.
When further asked if this elaborate process of check and counter-check was not really
carried on to keep up the fiction that there are two people as there used to be—the Military
Member of Council and the Commander-in-Chief—whereas at present there is only one
person in these capacities, he replied :—
I think that is largely the case, particularly if it is put in this way, that in order to maintain an adequate
status and influence for the heads of the Army, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, and so on,
it is, or has been considered necessary to retain the fiction of the Commander-in-Chief’s existence in this arrange
ment, it is through him that they derive their own status.
This astounding system has only to be described to be condemned. The Secretary of
State for India, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, in his evidence adumbrated certain Army reforms
that he had in his mind. We trust that amongst these reforms the fiction of one person
being two, and the anomaly of two establishments being maintained at public expense to
give effect to this fiction, will permanently disappear from the military system of India.
It is only fair to add that since the war began this lengthy procedure has, to a large
extent, been put on one side. Still, during this period the Commander-in-Chief has had
to perform the dual duties of the two offices which he nominally holds.
Isolation between an administrative department and its operating factors tends to
give to the secretariat so isolated an undue sense of the importance of minute and memo
randum writing. In the case of the Simla Departments, this is an evil which was constantly
brought to our notice, and many of our witnesses bear testimony to the inordinate dimen
sions attained by minute-writing, check and counter-check, and the reference backward
and forward of papers and proposals in the administrative departments of the Army.
The present system of check urgently requires simplification and acceleration. It is diffi
cult under it to ascertain where responsibility begins and ends, whilst the waste of time and
energy involved must operate detrimentally to efficient administration. Those engaged
in secretarial work seem to have forgotten that minute-writing is not the end all and be all
(C 48—176) N2