'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎10v] (20/248)

18
PART IV.—THE ADVANCE TO AMARA AND KUT.
In reply to that telegram the Viceroy, on June 2 nd, generally supported the advance,,
and he added the opinion that it would be undesirable or dangerous to tie down General
Nixon with precise orders in case they might not fit in with the local situation confronting
him. “ Under the original instructions he will, as soon as he is in a position to do so,
submit a plan for the occupation of the Basra vilayet, which includes A.mara. . . . We
should not propose to authorise any advance beyond Amara for which his lore? is not
adequate.”
8 . The advance on Amara—or “ Townshend’s Regatta, ’ as it was called locally wa ®
then very successfully carried out by that General. Boats of light draught were converted
into light-armoured gunboats, and were very effective. The enemy were pursued with
umelenting vigour, in spite of the sweltering heat and the difficulties of navigation, and
weie driven from position to position. On June 3 rd Amara was reached, and General
Townshend with 22 sailors and soldiers achieved the surrender of a garrison ol 700 1 inks.
^ Next day the Norfolk Regiment arrived, and all further opposition collapsed. As a military
operation this action was audaciously planned and well-timed, and it deserves high praise,
as t achieved great objects with comparatively small loss of life.
9 . General Nixon now proposed, with the full support of the Government of India,
to strike in the direction of Nasariyeh, a place which is 68 miles west of Kurnah, access to
it being through the channel of the Euphrates and the Hammar Lake, the heat was
terrific ; still General Nixon deemed it expedient to carry on the enterprise. Major-General
Gorringe, who was in charge of this column, succeeded in capturing Nasariyeh on July 25th,
with 950 prisoners, 17 guns and much booty. These operations were initiated by the
General on the spot, supported by the Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy of India,
> and acquiesced in by the Secretary of State. They appear to us to be sound horn
| both a military and political point of view. Our casualties amounted to 533 of all ranks,
but there was also much sickness.
10 . This succession of victories seemed to stimulate the authorities in India to a fresh
advance, and on July 27th the Viceroy sent a telegram to the Secretary of State to the effect
that. “ Now that Nasariyeh has been occupied the occupation of Kut-el-Amara is con
sidered by us to be a strategic necessity ” Communications ensued between the Secretary
of State and the Viceroy, and ultimately the Secretary of State assented to the advance
and accepted the military arrangements which General Nixon proposed to make after the
advance.
” 11 . On September 14th, the Headquarters of the Sixth Division reached Sheikh
Saad. and on the 15th Abu Rummanah, which had been very strongly fortified by
the Turks, was captured by us. On the 29th, after severe fighting, the Turks were
in full flight, and our cavalry had entered Kut-el-Amara. During the fight we
captured more than 1,700 prisoners and 13 guns, and inflicted heavy losses in men
and material. This part of the campaign, again, was brilliantly executed by
1 General Townshend and the Sixth Division of the Indian Army, and the whole series
\ of military operations during the past three months had been so extraordinarily successful,
that it is not surprising that a spirit of optimism and over-confidence as to what could be
achieved overcame General Nixon and his Headquarter Staff. It is sometimes as dangerous
to over-estimate victories as to under-rate them. These successes had been achieved by
striking quickly and continuously, pursuit after victory being intense and persistent.
Audacity had accomplished wonders ; was there any limit to its possibilities ?
12 . Although the expedition had by hard fighting achieved externally a series of mili-
tarv successes, there had been even from the beginning of the campaign signs that the
internal organisation, as regards river transport and the distribution of supplies through
such transport, was working at its maximum capacity. From the time the expedition moved
above Kurna, the river transport had been either insufficient or barely sufficient for its
wants and could not sustain additional pressure. For reasons which we will subsequently
examine, the provision of the type of steamer and barge specially adaptable to the Tigris
had been delayed. Railway schemes had either been put on one side or not pressed by
the Indian Government. On July 10 th, Sir John Nixon forwarded to India a demand for
six paddle-steamers, three stern-wheelers, eight tugs and forty-three barges. In making
this demand. Sir John Nixon stated that—
“ The inadequacy of the light-draught fleet available has, nevertheless, been a constant source of delay,
uncertainty and anxiety. Now that it is clear that time and experience will not mend matters, but that wear
and tear and the course of events must inevitably tend to steady diminution of the shipping fit for military
operations in these rivers, I would strongly urge that the six paddlers, etc. . . asked for in my telegram
under reference, may be provided.”