Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎4v] (8/312)

THE PIONEER MAIL.
[August 21, 1878.
been prompted by the occupation of Cyprus, so
! that the present mission is, as vre say, the com
plement of Lord Beaconsfield's great coup.
THE K1VAL EMBASSIES.
The fretful questions already asked in Par
liament concerning the Cabul mission, fore
shadow an effort on the part of Her Ma
jesty's unpatriotic opposition to throw ob
stacles in its way, as far as they can. Pro
bably, however, the Q-overnment will be
spared the only reproach which, under the cir
cumstances, would have a certain force—the
only attack it might be difficult to parry. The
skirmishers of the left will, no doubt, freely
denounce the present enterprise, on the general
priuciple that denunciation is their metier, but
they will not be likely to see that in one of its
aspects it really is discreditable. It has been
postponed too loog. The Eiissians have got in
advance of us, and British emissaries are now
hurrying forward to counteract an aggressive
movement which they might, with greater digni
ty at an earlier opportunity, have rendered
impossible. We have already traced the course
of events leading up to the present mission.
It is the culmination of the policy which paci
fied Khelat: It is the final raison d'etre of
the occupation of Quetta. And General Cham
berlain will be spared the disagreeable work of
clearing up past misunderstandings. All that
was done at Peshawur in advance. There
would be nothing wanting to the completeness
of the whole process, but for the interference
of the Eussians at Oabul. To reach a sound
j estimate of the present situation therefore, two
currents of thought must be followed. We
must take note of the skilful and far-sighted way
in which the mission, now so necessary, has been
I rendered possible by previous arrangements ;
and we must keep in view the circumstances
which have given rise to a result it would be
affectation to treat in otherwise than mortifying,
—not to say ignominious,—the anticipation of
our embassy by the Governor of Samarkand.
Bussian progress in Asia is not necessarily
:•* opposed to British interests/ It goes without
' saying that there must be a line beyond which
the unwholesomely rapid growth of Jtiussia's
'5 mere nominal supremacy must be stopped. But
J if common sense had always prevailed in English
* 4 councils, this unreal development would never
have given us any trouble. The consolidation
' of Russian power iu tracts of Central Asia,
where it finds a proper field for activity,
should be regarded by Englishmen with sym-
j pathy. Eussian civilisation is of a low order,
but it is an advance on the indigenous civilisa
tion of Turkistan. Eussian activity in Asia has
only been regarded with annoyance by English
statesmen worthy of the name, when it ran into
mere flag-planting. There is no end to that
process, if it is not checked by some external
force. And if there is one kind of activity
worse than flag-planting, it is intriguing with
native states to facilitate flag-planting in future.
But the truth is, that though of late the
energies of Eussian governors and generals in
• Central Asia have been spent almost entirely
in this way, Eussia herself is hardly more
to blame for that result than England. PW-
planting can only be checked by an "external
force, but the application of a very little exter
nal force is enough for the purpose. Looking
back over the whole course of Central Asian
politics for the last ten or fifteen years, it is im
possible not to feel that every annoyance Eng
land has experienced in connection with them
tas been due to her own stupid inactivity. In
a dull-witted way the Liberals accepted Lord
Lawrence's doctrines as an unchangeable creed
We are very far from contending that they were
wrong at the time, but no one can go home from
India, stereotype the views of Indian affairs he
entertained at the time of his departure, and
force these on all succeeding Viceroys against
their will without doing mischief. That is the
course events have taken. The Liberals had a
long reign ; the Central Asian policy they espous
ed became a rigidjaw for Governors-General.
No argument on the subject had the slightest
effect. The opinions of the party, in reference
to Eussians, Afghans, and Turkestans, were
prescribed by its professional adviser, and
while the Liberals remained in the ascendant,
those opinions had to be be translated into
action,—or rather into inaction,—out here.
The consequence has been that just as a very
little water will spread far over a dead level,
the pale Eussian colour has crept over the map.
In either of two ways its progress could have
been stopped. English ministers at St. Peters
burg, boldly instructed from home, could have
stopped it. It might have been stopped by
a counter development of British ascendancy
in realms beyond the Himalayas. But successive
ministries were too timid to speak to the Czar's
Government, too much enslaved to the theory
of non-intervention to let Indian Viceroys put
a foot beyond their frontiers as by law establish
ed. The Eussian Government itself has notori
ously been averse to an over-rapid growth of its
dominions in Central Asia, but its armies of
occupation have been restless, its generals and
colonels ambitious. It is a far cry to Loch Awe ;
and last of all if the Czar may have been inclined
to hold them back rather than urge them for
ward, they have found by experience that press
ing forward is, at all events, an offence that
he readily forgives. So the shallow inunda
tion spread ; and if some Englishmen argued
that a'very little show of energy on our part
would keep it back, the reply,~-changing the
issue,—always was the invasion of India by
the Eussians is impossible. Of course it is
impossible—the conception a political absurdity,
but that is not the point. The danger
to be averted was a foolish belief among the
natives that it was possible and impending.
The benefit to be achieved by a progressive po
licy was a hearty belief in the continued vitality
of our reign in all parts of the East where our
prestige means civilisation and popular welfare.
It would have cost us little, and it would have
gained us much to have done in Lord Mayo's
time what Lord Lytton is doing now. But the
deadweight of an influence at home that was
unintelligent but omnipotent paralysed the
Indian Foreign Office,—and the result is the
impudent intrusion of the Eussians at Cabul.
A law of politics, as inviolable as those of
astronomy, enacts that a country which—in
an emergency that claims it—defers spirited
action too long, must exert itself to show all
the more spirit in the end, unless it is willing
to pay the appointed penalty and accept humi
liation. So things have fallen out as regards
our relations with Cabul. As the legitimate
sequel to the preparatory steps Lord Lytton
has for the last three years been engaged in
taking, the Cabul mission would have been
entitled to be gentle and conciliatory. But the
denouement has been unluckily postponed. An
act which would have shown activity and en
hanced the prestige of a Government performing
it spontaneously, cannot but be regarded now
as hurriedly decided on, in self-defence, to avert
a disaster. The fact of the Cabul mission will
now be unimpressive. The good it may do
will depend on the measures it may take. It
is England's own fault, and from their point
of view the Eussians are not to be blamed ; but
a complication has now arisen in which the
Government of India must make up its mind
to take a high tone with the half organised
State to which it is sending its present embassy.
At the first blush, the situation in which the
Ameer finds himself will be very flattering to
his vanity. He is courted by both his giant
neighbours. Evidently it will be his to weigh
the rival offers they may make ! His mind
should be disabused of that idea at the earliest
possible date. From its own free good will
the Indian Government might have had much
to offer the Ameer. But directly the proposal
is to play off Eussia and ourselves one against
the other, the aspect of affairs has changed. The
Indian Government might have respected an
independent Cabul to the end of time. But a
semi-independent Cabul under Eussian influ
ence is quite a different thing. Eather than ^
submit to that, England would be forced to
undertake the complete conquest of Cabul.
This view of the subject should be explained
both to Eussians and Afghans with the utmost
frankness.
A WEST-ASIAN CONPEDEEATION.
There is a democratic ring about the phrase
which speaks rather of Europe than of Asia. The
East is not the land where to look for local self-
government, constitutional liberties, or confe
derations of autonomous States. But an irres- <
ponsible politician is not the man to regard the
political unities, and Sir George Campbell is |
irresponsible as he is irrepressible. In his book |
on the Turkish question he said that administra- ^
tion was his trade. Constitution-mougering ap
pears to be his foible. No sooner is the agree
ment between the Ministry and the Porte for the
better protection of the Asiatic dominions of
the Sultan published, than Sir George Camp
bell is ready with a complete scheme for
their self-government. He wishes to see a
West-Asian Confederacy established in the pro
vinces of Asia Minor. The time is favourable,
he considers, for the attempt. The agreement
made with the Porte gives England a voice in
the future administration of the Asiatic pro
vinces. We have promised to defend them in the
event of any aggression on the part of Eussia.
In a subsequent paragraph the Sultan promises
to provide for the better government of the peo
ple and the protecton of the Christian races. The
measures to be adopted are to be subsequently
settled. These are the terms of the Anglo-Turk
ish arrangement, and they are brief enough. The
letter of the agreement hardly binds England
to anything more than the military guarantee.
We do not undertake to administer Asia Minor.
We do not even give the military guarantee on
the condition that the provinces shall be better
governed. We have simply obtained for
ourselves the right of resisting the advance of
Eussia beyond the new frontier of Ears and
Batoum. Sir George Campbell, however, has
jumped at the conclusion that the arrangement
with Turkey puts that country " precisely on the
footing of one of the protected Indian States of
the second degree." An Indian State of the
first degree, it must be explained, is a State
which has obtained our military protection
without any formal agreement to be guided by
us in its internal affairs. A State of the second
degree is one that, in consideration of military
defence and protection, has bound itself to re
form its administration and take advice. Asia
Minor is now, according to Sir George Camp
bell, in precisely the same position as Oudh
was at the beginning of the century. There is
nothing in the agreement with the Sultan to
warrant this inference. The analogy is alto
gether a false one. In Oudh our support was
essential to the maintenance of the Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India.
Vizier agaiqet internal dissension. His terri
tories would have gone to pieces of them
selves had not the weak hand of the ruler been
strengthened by British troops. Erom the first
we were compelled to take an active part in an
administration which was utterly effete. Asia
Minor, on the contrary, may be badly governed |
by the Porte, but there is no question about the
vitality of the Government. But for the in-
THE PIONEER MAIL.
entertained at the time of his departure, and
force these on all succeeding Viceroys against
their will without doing mischief. That is the
course events have taken. The Liberals had a
long reign ; the Central Asian policy they espous
ed became a rigid law for Governors-General.
No argument on the subject had the slightest
effect. The opinions of the party, in reference
to Russians, Afghans, and Turkestans, were
prescribed by its professional adviser, and
while the Liberals remained in the ascendant,
those opinions had to be be translated into
action,—or rather into inaction,—out here.
The consequence has been that just as a very
little water will spread far over a dead level,
the pale Eussian colour has crept over the map.
In either of two ways its progress could have
been stopped. English ministers at St. Peters
burg, boldly instructed from home, could have
stopped it. It might have been stopped by
a counter development of British ascendancy
in realms beyond the Himalayas. But successive
ministries were too timid to speak to the Czar's
Government, too much enslaved to the theory
of non-intervention to let Indian Viceroys put
a foot beyond their frontiers as by law establish
ed. The Eussiau Government itself has notori
ously been averse to an over-rapid growth of its
dominions in Central Asia, but its armies of
occupation have been restless, its generals and
colonels ambitious. It is a far cry to Loch Awe ;
and last of all if the Czar may have been inclined
to hold them back rather than urge them for
ward, they have found by experience that press
ing forward is, at all events, an offence that
he readily forgives. So the shallow inunda
tion spread ; and if some Englishmen argued
that a very little show of energy on our part
would keep it back, the reply,—changing the
issue,—always was the invasion of India by
the Eussians is impossible. Of course it is
impossible—the conception a political absurdity,
but that is not the point. The danger
to be averted was a foolish belief among the
natives that it was possible and impending.
The benefit to be achieved by a progressive po-
-Kcj was a hearty belief in the continued vitality
of our reign in all parts of the East where our
prestige means civilisation and popular welfare.
It would have cost us little, and it would have
gained us much to have done in Lord Mayo's
time what Lord Lytton is doing now. But the
deadweight of an influence at home that was
unintelligent but omnipotent paralysed the
Indian Foreign Office,—and the result is the
impudent intrusion of the Eussians at Cabul.
A law of politics, as inviolable as those of
astronomy, enacts that a country which—in
an emergency that claims it—defers spirited
action too long, must exert itself to show all
the more spirit in the end, unless it is willing
to pay the appointed penalty and accept humi
liation. So things have fallen out as regards
our relations with Cabul. As the legitimate
sequel to the preparatory steps Lord Lytton
has for the last three years been engaged in
taking, the Cabul mission would have been
entitled to be gentle and conciliatory. But the
denouement has been unluckily postponed. An
act which would have shown activity and en
hanced the prestige of a Government performing
it spontaneously, cannot but be regarded now
as hurriedly decided on, in self-defence, to avert
a disaster. The fact of the Cabul mission will
now be unimpressive. The good it may do
will depend on the measures it may take. It
is England's own fault, and from their point
of view the Eussians are not to be blamed ; but
a complication has now arisen in which the
Government of India must make up its mind
to take a high tone with the half organised
State to which it is sending its present embassy.
At the first blush, the situation in which the
A-meer finds himself will be very flattering to
his vanity. He is courted by both his giaut
neighbours. Evidently it will be his to weigh
the rival offers they may make ! His mind
should be disabused of that idea at the earliest
possible date. Erom its own free good will
the Indian Government might have had much
to offer the Ameer. But directly the proposal
is to play off Eussia and ourselves one against
the other, the aspect of affairs has changed. The
Indian Government might have respected an
independent Cabul to the end of time. But a
semi-independent Cabul under Eussian influ
ence is quite a different thing. Eather than
submit to that, England would be forced to
undertake the complete conquest of Cabul.
This view of the subject should be explained
both to Eussians and Afghans with the utmost
frankness.
A WEST-ASIAN CONEEDEEATION.
Theee is a democratic ring about the phrase
which speaks rather of Europe than of Asia. The
East is not the land where to look for local self-
government, constitutional liberties, or confe
derations of autonomous States. But an irres- ,
ponsible politician is not the man to regard the
political unities, and Sir George Campbell is 1
irresponsible as he is irrepressible. In his book |
on the Turkish question he said that administra- 1
tion was his trade. Constitution-mongering ap
pears to be his foible. No sooner is the agree
ment between the Ministry and the Porte for the
better protection of the Asiatic dominions of
the Sultan published, than Sir George Camp
bell is ready with a complete scheme for
their self-government. He wishes to see a
West-Asian Confederacy established in the pro
vinces of Asia Minor. The time is favourable,
he considers, for the attempt. The agreement
made with the Porte gives England a voice in
the future administration of the Asiatic pro
vinces. We have promised to defend them in the
event of any aggression on the part of Eussia.
In a subsequent paragraph the Sultan promises
to provide for the better government of the peo
ple and the protecton of the Christian races. The
measures to be adopted are to be subsequently
settled. These are the terms of the Anglo-Turk
ish arrangement, and they are brief enough. The
letter of the agreement hardly binds England
to anything more than the military guarantee.
We do not undertake to administer Asia Minor,
We do not even give the military guarantee on
the condition that the provinces shall be better
governed. We have simply obtained for
ourselves the right of resisting the advance of
Eussia beyond the new frontier of Kars and
Batoum. Sir George Campbell, however, has
jumped at the conclusion that the arrangement
with Turkey puts that country " precisely on the
footing of one of the protected Indian States of
the second degree." An Indian State of the
first degree, it must be explained, is a State
which has obtained our military protection
without any formal agreement to be guided by
us in its internal affairs. A State of the second
degree is one that, in consideration of military
defence and protection, has bound itself to re
form its administration and take advice. Asia
Minor is now, according to Sir George Camp
bell, in precisely the same position as Oudh
was at the beginning of the century. There is
nothing in the agreement with the Sultan to
warrant this inference. The analogy is alto
gether a false one. In Oudh our support was
essential to the maintenance of the Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India.
Vizier agaiiift internal dissension. His terri
tories would have gone to pieces of them
selves had not the weak hand of the ruler been
strengthened by British troops. Erom the first
we were compelled to take an active part in an
administration which was utterly effete. Asia
Minor, on the contrary, may be badly governed mi
by the Porte, but there is no question about the
vitality of the Government. But for the in-