مجموعة ٦/ ٢١(٢) "المملكة العربية السعودية: العلاقات مع حكومة بريطانيا: المفوضية السعودية في لندن والوزير البريطاني في جدة. تمديد معاهدة جدة." [و‎‎١‎٧‎٠] (٧٦١/٣٣٩)

3
the independence of the Yemen should be maintained. In conclusion, Ibn Saud
declared vehemently that there must be an outbreak in the Yemen—perhaps before
the death of the Imam. In that event, what would the Italians do and what would
be the attitude of His Majesty’s Government?
5. Mr. Rendel replied that His Majesty’s Government fully appreciated the
^ dangers of the situation in the Yemen. There was no doubt that the Italians
had been, and still are, intriguing actively in that country and would be very
ready to fish in the waters they had helped to trouble. But while the internal
situation was perhaps more dangerous than it had been, he was inclined, for the
following reasons and speaking purely personally, to doubt whether the Italian
danger was now quite as acute as it had been a year ago. In the Rome /
understanding of 1927 His Majesty’s Government had made it quite clear, and
the Italians had formally recognised, that His Majesty’s Government regarded
it as “a vital imperial interest that no European Power should establish itself
on the Arabian shore of the Red Sea.” (At this point Sir Reader Bullard gave
King Ibn Saud, for convenience of reference, a copy of an Arabic translation of
the relevant text, which had already been communicated to His Majesty by
Sir Andrew Ryan.) There was, of course, no reason to trust any Italian promises
as such, but it was obvious that, in view of the terms of the Rome understanding,
any attempt by Italy to establish herself in the Yemen would be a direct challenge
to His Majesty’s Government. No doubt Italian hotheads, possibly Italian local
officials, cherished designs on the Yemen. But Italian policy would be directed
from Rome, and present indications suggested that for European reasons, and
in view of British rearmament, Italy was not now anxious to embark on any
conflict with His Majesty’s Government, but was rather seeking to establish
better relations. Even if this view should prove mistaken, he did not think
King Ibn Saud need be seriously disturbed by Italian activities in the Yemen.
Saudi and British interests were closely parallel, and it was difficult to see how
any development which threatened Saudi independence could fail equally to
threaten British interests, so that the probability was that, in any such event.
Ibn Saud would, in any case, find Great Britain at his side. At a later interview
the opportunity was taken to mention that the Italians themselves seemed
anxious to keep the Rome understanding alive, and apparently feared a forward
policy on the part of His Majesty’s Government (see Foreign Office despatch to 1
Jedda, No. 182 of the 24th February).
6. Mr. Rendel added that he understood (from Sheikh Hafiz Wahba) that
His Majesty wished to know the attitude of His Majesty’s Government towards
his suggestion for an exchange of information about the Y r emen, &c. Mr. Rendel
saw no reason why this should not be possible. His Majesty’s Government would
be glad to pass on to Ibn Saud any information of interest which they could
properly communicate to him, though in doing this they would, of course, be
assuming that Ibn Saud was satisfied that there would be no risk of leakage at
the Saudi end.
7. Ibn Saud then turned to Iraq. He had good information, for people
wrote to him from all parts of the Arab world and he had seen many Iraqi
pilgrims, and the reports all tallied with each other. Everyone was suspicious
of the new Iraqi Government and regarded it as not Arab. There had been much
to be said against Yasin-al-Hashimi, who had even gone so far as to ask Sheikh
Yusuf Yasin to tell Ibn Saud to beware of the British Government, but at least
his policy was an Arab policy. To the policy of the present Iraqi Government
there were two objections : it was communistic, and it was under Turkish
influence. The Turks had begun by trying to get possession of the Sanjak of
Alexandretta, and their next aim would be to acquire Mosul.
8. Mr. Rendel said that the title of Communist was sometimes misapplied
to anyone who favoured economic social reform. He understood that such
reforms were long overdue in Iraq, where there was much extreme poverty, and
it was possible that Hikmet Suleiman’s legislation was necessary, and was not
imposed in any spirit of communism. It might be well, therefore, to reserve
judgment on this point until the Amir Saud and Sheikh Hafiz Wahba should
have seen the situation for themselves during their impending visit to Bagdad.
(Here Ibn Saud said that Hikmet Suleiman did not care a rap for the poor or
for anyone.) As to Turkish influence, Mr. Rendel believed that, while the maker
of the military couf d’Etat, Bakr Sidqi, and some of his military associates, might
be described as pro-Turkish, Hikmet Suleiman showed signs of wanting to shake
[981 m — 5] b 2