ملف ٣٥٧\١٩١٩ الجزء ٢ "السكك الحديدية في بلاد فارس" [ظ‎‎٤‎٢‎٩] (١١٥٠/٨٦٣)

nm
already possessing an option for that purpose; if they fear political pen •
through the railway, we are prepared, however unfounded such apprehensi 1 ^ 011
appear to us, to discuss any reasonable means to allay them, e.g., American° nS ^
pation. That to me the benehts of railway construction in Persia are so obvi^^u ”
I am unable to appreciate Persian hesitation to close with so advantageous 10 ^# >^ el
as that of the Persian Railway Syndicate. That financial stringency
ground for their hesitation, but now that there are competent American ad ' li#^ uClC
here, they should be instructed to report on the capacity of the country to pavT !jA ctor 1
railway system. 1 ■' 01 T
. So much for the ground-work of the situation. A new element has arise ,: # silice '
however, which, from a mechanical and technical point of view, might not inmos •KT:a’>ek el
provide a solution of Persia’s railway problem so far as the mere question H ^ ereas
transport and commun^iations is concerned. I refer to the “ roadrails ” system
traction. It is extremely difficult for a layman to say whether roadrails, also knoj®n.s°H
as the Stronach Dutton system, are suitable for use in Persia or would provide wit' ’ '
regularity and efficiency the mechanical haulage which this country requires
first sight the system would seem well suited for the purpose; if this view were con
firmed by competent engineers, its remarkable cheapness in comparison with
standard railway would, in Persian eyes, be an irresistible argument in favour
its employment. There is therefore some possibility of the Persfans wishing 0^00 intrunl
of
iions mvc
jjerd axis 0
taA a
justifiable grounds of economy, to have a roadrails line laid between the Irak frontiyiaticrai
and Tehran in preference to the standard railway contemplated by the Persia: d mavb
Railway Syndicate. If that situation arose, it would clearly be unwise awletoW<
ungracious on the part of His Majesty’s Government to insist consistently with tLudvanti
support which they have hitherto afforded to the option acquired by the Persia:’;y fiat tl
Railway Syndicate on the construction of a standard line if a/rai lroad s line, at onepPersian
tenth or one-eighth of the cost, could.serve Persia’s immediate purposes equally wef dultan
The eventuality would be avoided ifthnre was a fusion of interests between tjiexistiiF
Persian Railway Syndicate and the fRai jhoad s Company in regard to constructi |]( rom ]{ m
work in Persia and if the Persian Railway Syndicate were willing to laytm|oa|p 0Ilff as
instead of a railway 7 on the lines mentioned in the option, if called on to do so by th, ;in( j ^ ^
Persian Government. In this way it seems to me possible to forestall a mo] : . ; r ^ ffi ;
undesirable conflict of interest between two British enterprises, to avoid the questio • ]); z
arising whether the laying of {rail road s is an infraction of a railway option or cor m ]( ermar
cession, and to strengthen considerably the chances of any sort of norfi-so
construction being undertaken by British firms. These were the considerations whilL^q j.
I had in mind when expressing the hope in my telegram that your Lordship q
urge on the two firms in question the desirability of combining their interests. Li^t 0 qj
The question of railway construction in Persia is one which has interested ir u '
for a long time, and although I am aware that it has been considered by If p •
Majesty’s Government and discussed by bodies and individuals far more compete!
than myself, your Lordship will, I trust, permit me to express the personal vief ■, ,
which I have formed on the subject in the hope that they may be of interest an ;!
service. L
'0 During my.earlier residence in Tehran, when I acted as secretary in charge| eil , lia
commercial affairs, I formed the opinion, and expressed it in a confidential trad 0
report in 1908, that the policy of road-making in Persia had not given the resut, , 0In e
expected of it, either from the point of view of opening up Persia or from that er ari
British trade, and that His Majesty’s Government would be well advised to cof
0 WUUia ue wen Ciuvi^u. tw
centrate^theR ^principal energies in the future on a policy of railway construchoj
- JT xxJ uxxv^ 1 Lt U LIX Vy Oil CL pUJL 1C V VJ L X Ctxx vr cvj
I am still of that opinion, and think that the course of events since that date tena .
^ w ^xxxxxxv UXXCXU CXXXy OO UL1 OO OX OVOXXUk? OXXXX/^ - ’
to show that it was a correct one. We wish to sell British goods to Persia.
v/v- v^\_/x x v 7 U v/XXO . T ? VV loll OOll J 1 1 1 ^ 1 olx VlvlVXO •
purchasing power of this country is diminishing, and it seems unlikely that it wi
increase unless means can be found to increase Persian exports. The princips
obstacle to the development of an export trade is that many exportable articles either
cannot reach the sea at all or can do so only at a cost in respect of transport charges
which renders them unsaleable at world prices. Take agriculture as one example
^ , M •’ — exportable surplus
Reused
roa(
Persia in any year.produces with an ordinarily good harvest an expui vau^ r *
of. foodstuffs, notwithstanding the very primitive methods of cultivation which aI J
still employed and notwithstanding the fact that only a proportion of cultivable aI Mv r fiuir
is actually under cultivation. If local shortage or famines occur, it is not because I am
fq CTATl 1 oil o 1 ^ ^ X 1 i 1 e Oil i X _ L 1 J on f 7 T 1 PII 11 S 0 ^ ffipiq
—j xxxxvxwx ^LXXUX vctuxuil. XX 1UU611 bllUJ UP UUAJU1, ^ m xxwvi
a general shortage in the country, but because of the lamentably deficient mean Jpj)eniD e
xi i ol 1m L i i_ i i • , i *i *j • _i lJJ6Iv
# Cl o ^ ux y ? M IX U MX-X Ct LIOVH L LUX' XCLlllxyXX UCX ixx j
distribution and because such means as do exist are prohibitively costly. —> ,
p .I t — __ ni . n 1 1 - rapid transpo 1
fore, distribution were assured by a system of cheaper and more
Nfu
'Loftl