"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [و‎‎١‎٢‎١] (٢٥٦/٢٤٤)

L3
I lie position of the Germans in Persia is entirely dependent on their being - able to keep
open the road to Bagdad via Kermanshah.'
In view of these reports, the material benefit to be obtained In an advance on Bagdad —
if, thereby, as appears probable, the German ascendancy and the Allies’ precarious position in
Persia can be checked—seems to render this step essential, while if no such effective action
be taken, the danger to British interests in Persia and in Afghanistan mav be a matter of the
most serious consequence."
Sir Louis Mallet writes :—
reason for attaching so much impijjrtance to the occupation of Bagdad is primarily
that it is in Mesopotamia that we can inflict the maximum damage upon Turkey at the least
cost to ourselves.”
1 he political advantages of the occupation are fully described also in the memorandum by
the Political Department, India Office, wherein it is pointed that—
“ • • • ^ appears to be of primary importance for the maintenance of our prestige in
the East that we should get full value out of our military achievements wherevei
possible, if we stop short of Bagdad the political effect of our victorious advance
into Mesopotamia will be largely discounted. The fact of our halting . . will
undoubtedly be ascribed to weakness.”
4. Though the Committee arc unanimously in favour of the occupation of Bagdad, which,
according to General Sir John Nixon, won Id not at present entail much difficulty, they are of
opinion that the capture of the city followed by retirement would have an adverse political
effect outweighing the advantages to be gained by occupation. i'oi - this reason the Committee
are opposed to any idea of a temporary mil itary occupation.
o. On military grounds the capture : nd occupation of Bagdad offer distinct and solid
advantages. The enemy, apart from the blow which his prestige would sustain, would be
deprived of an important trade centre, a valuable depot, a base, and a railhead (of the section
of the Bagdad railway now working from iamarra to Bagdad). Our forces would be astride
the main route from Europe through Kern anshah to the interior of Persia, and would deprive
the Germans of a base for their intrigues i i the Middle East.
The Vractic ibility of an Advance.
ti. The General Staff, War Office, the Ciunniander-in-Chief in India, the Military Secretary,
India Office, and the local military authoi^ties are all m agreement in the opinion, in which
the Committee concur, that the British foijres at present in Mesopotamia, though apparently
adequate for the capture of Bagdad, are not sufficient to ensure its retention, which is regarded
as essential. General Sir John Nixon haspstated that if the Turks should turn their serious
hould send to Mesopotamia the large organised
operation, he would require one division and one
present force. The Committee consider that a
essary to hold Bagdad, but they think that two
s ibstituted if a British cavalry reeriment is not
attention to the recovery of Bagdad, and
forces that would be needed for such an
British cavalry regiment in addition to h
force not less th an this is immediately nejj
regiments of Indian cavalry mio-ht he
available. It is essential that these trooj s should reach Basra at the earliest possible date,
as their presence will be required at Bagds
part of the Turks to re-take the city,
that the reinforcements should begin to
orders for the advance.
In order to provide for possible eveifjfualities.
division which can be suitably employe!
follow the first as soon as required. In t
1 to ensure its occupation against attempts on the
f or this reason the Committee have recommended
at Basra within four weeks of the issue of
operations on a large scale, even these t
necessary in 1916 to send further reinforce nents.
7. It is understood that the existing
enable this advance to be made and to
addition to the offensive [tower of Genera
safety of the communications by river. It
these troops to the Persian Gulf can be un
a second division, or those units of a
in Mesopotamia, should be held in readiness to
e event of the Turks being in a position later on
to concentrate forces from distant quarters on the Upper Tigris, with the object of offensive
divisions may prove insufficient, and it may be
numbers of vessels on the Tigris is sufficient to
ensure the supply of the advanced troops. The
flotilla of shallow-draught gunboats now U nler construction will eventually be an important
Nixon’s force, and will greatly contribute to the
Jis also understood that the transport over sea of
lertaken by the Admiralty.
8. If we are to gain the greatest possible advantages, both political and military, from an
advance to Bagdad, a very early decision on the matter should be made. The sooner Bagdad
is in our hands the greater will be the effect
CONCLUSKJ.VS.
1. The Committee consider that, both on military and political grounds, an early advance
upon the occupation of Bagdad is most desk ible ; but that, unless the Expeditionary Force
now in Mesopotamia can be so reinforced
Bagdad, no attempt should be made either t
The immediate reinforcements neeessar
equivalent of one infantry division of the ln<
It is essential, if an advance on Bagdad be d
should at once be definitely assigned to Mesci
to arrive at Basra within four weeks of the i
The Committee are of opinion that tin
garrison of India.
If reinforcements on the scale mentiom
standing, the Indian Government are satisfied
lat it can maintain its position after reaching
seize or occupy that city.
for the retention of Bagdad are at least the
an Army and one or two regiments of cavalry,
ided on, that reinforcements of this strength
otamia, and that they should without fail begin
no of the orders for fhe advance,
reinforcements cannot be furnished from the
above cannot be provided, and if, notwith-
hat General Nixon can defeat the enemy forces