"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٠] (٢٥٦/٢٤٣)

42
Constantinople, anil also to conjecture that arrival of (irand Duke in the Caucasus may imply
more rigorous military measures in Persia. If this surmise is correct, (lorman great effort
would seem to be imminent. What direction it will take 1 have not enough indications
to predict with certainty, but for the present Hamadan seems to be point of attack.
German Consul there is openly threatening our Consuls to avenge arrest of Turkish Consul
at Resht. He is said to have 300 tribesmen led by Germans in his pay against whom
Governor,4iu*iti tlHiugh. has possibly -00 decently led men, while
gendarmerie and police cannot be relied on. Government have sent 100 Persian Cossacks from
Teheran, but they confess that position is very bad, and that position of Consuls is most
precarious. i£a**iau Aliuktei' is unking.for Peti-ogiud to. scud a yogi inn id of
Cotaiaoks ii'tnn ikazvm. Provided tiny arc nut. indetiniUdv dw-H-ined there. I think that
measure would be a good one. but we must not l>e led into undue weakening of our only force
within striking distance from the capital. Sultanabad is threatened. In Kars Wassmus is
making great efforts to prevent new Governor of Bush ire from taking up his post. That
Germans intend an attempt of some kind in Teheran, seems to be clear from the fact that
Swedish Commandant of Gendarmerie has been inquiring of Armenians what their attitude
would be if Persian Government should declare themselves on the side of one of belligerents,
or, if an attack were made on Christians. Attempt would be certainly made in the month
Moharem, which begins now when religious fanaticism is easily roused.
. ao9.
No
Heport of an Inti, r-Departmental Committee am the Strategical Situation in
dated \§th Oci'djer 1915.
Terms op R8ferknce.
In accordance with a decision of the Cabinet of the 4th October, the Prime Minister
recommended that a consultation should without lelay be held between representatives of the
India Office, the General Staff of the War Office! the Admiralty, and the Foreign Office on
the subject of the strategic situation in Meso] otamia:—To consider in particular, having
regard to the position in Persia, to the progre s of the Bagdad Railway, and to all other
relevant matters :—
1. Whether there should be an advance on Bagdad.
'1. The defensive positions at Bagdad as regajds a possible advance of Turkish troops.
3. Whether without Bagdad as a point of departure any offensive operations on a large
scale could be made by the Turks in th<j neighbourhood.
4. Generally the effect which the occupationlof Bagdad by us would have on the Turkish
forces engaged against Russia and against ourselves in the Dardanelles.
Mesopotamia,
Rep<j
The Committee had before them:—
(«) Some former official telegraphic correspJndence on the subject.
(5) Recent official telegraphic correspondence from the 29th September up to the
10th October between the Secretary,jof State for India, the Army Department of
the Government of India, and General Sir John Xixon, the Commander of the
British Forces in Mesopotamia, regarding the defeat of the Turkish Army at Kut-
al-Amara. on the Tigris, on the 28th .September, and the military situation created.
(r ) Private telegrams from the 4th Octobei up to the 9th October between the Secretary
of State for India and the Vlcei >y regarding the further operations of the
Mesopotamia Force, with Bagdad as he possible objective.
(</) Memoranda by the Military Secretary, ndia Office, and the General Staff, War Office,
dealing with the military aspects of m advance on and occupation of Bagdad.
(e) Memoranda by the Political Departnn nt of the India Office, the Foreign Office, and
Sir Louis Mallet dealing with the piklitical aspects of the question.
(/) The views of the Viceroy and Con mander-in-Chief in India upon the military
situation in that country as conveyi 1 in a private letter from the Viceroy to the
Secretary of State for India.
2. The question of whether an advance pipon
considered from two aspects :—
Bagdad should
undertaken can
Desirability amd Practicability.
The Desirability ofun Advance to Bagdad.
3. On political grounds the early capturJ and occupation of Bagdad are considered most
desirable. This will relieve directly the existing situation in Asiatic Turkey, in Persia, and
in Afghanistan.
To quote from the Foreign Office memoraijjdum :—
“ ‘ Bagdad is the centre of Government
portion of the trade passing through.
“ ‘ The effect of such occupancy would v
Government throughout the whole of Arab
sacred city of Kerbela ’ ”
as of the very greatest importance, not onl
. but more especially with regard
even in Afghanistan.
of the whole district, and controls the greater
eaken the power and prestige of ihe Turkish
a, and would place within British control the
An advance to Bagdad may be regarded from the political or Foreign Office point of view
on account of the situation in Asiatic Turkey,
to the present critical situation in Persia and