"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [ظ‎‎٦‎٤] (٢٥٦/١٣١)

No. 6.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 28//i September 1914.
(Telegraphic.) . . ^ .
Mv telegram of 26th September. The situation is still acute, but it is decided to take no
action for a couple of days. Meanwhile be prepared to act as proposed.
No. 7.
Viceroy to Secr tary of State for India, dated 28fh September 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
Following from Resident at Bushire, dated 26th September:
Informer Mahomet Amin
supplied me with copies of what he declares are translations of three cypher telegrams sent in
latter half of July by Enver Pasha, of Constantinople, to Bin Saood, warning latter of the
despatch of arms and ammunition, and officers for training his Arabs, measures called for by
the imminence of war in Europe. In further telegrams Enver informed Yali of Basra that
Turkish Government is prepared to help Germany in return for assistance received during
Balkan War; that arms and ammunition are being sent to Basra under German flag, and
that 32 secret emissaries, including German officers, are on their way to preach a Jehad m
Afghanistan, Baluchistan, and India."
No. 8.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 2nd October 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
Reference my telegrams of 26th and 28th September. Government have decided to take
action therein indicated. The force mentioned should be embarked so as to sail on 10th.
Please telegraph which Brigade and Commander will be sent; also which Mountain Batteries.
After force has sailed get ready remainder of 6 th Division for despatch. Will telegraph
more precise instructions to-morrow as to action to be taken. Presume you will adopt
Expedition “ D” for description of this movement.
No. 9.
Secretary of Slate for India to Viceroy, dated 3rd October 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
Mv telegram of 2nd October. Please instruct Officer Commanding that we are at peace
with Turkey and on no account is he to land troops on Turkish territory or take any other
hostile action against Turks without orders from you except in case of absolute military
necessity. He may disembark if convenient to do so either on Abadan Island or at
Muhammerah. but preferably at Abadan. On this point, however, lie should work in concert
with Naval and Political authorities. He should endeavour to avoid any action which might
cause friction with the Arabs either in Persian or Turkish territory, as we may have to rely
on their co-operation in the event of a rupture with Turkey. He will of course take all steps
to protect the oil tanks and other British interests in Persian territory. You will doubtless
take measures in sufficient time to waiui the Political Officers in Gulf of action contemplated,
so that necessary communications maybe made by them to Sheikhs of Muhammerah and
Koweit, and to Bin Saood in good time so that they may have sufficient previous confidential
intimation of approach of expedition. Resident, Baghdad, should also be warned and directed
to communicate with consul at Basra. Admiralty are instructing Naval Authorities.
No. 10.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 5th October 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
The force under orders is only intended to occupy Abadan, protect oil tanks and pipe line, cover
landing of reinforcements, if these should be necessary, and show Arabs that we intend to support
them against Turks. With warship at Muhammerah troops detailed are considered ample for
above purposes. Should Turkey become a belligerent management of expedition will devolve
on you, but instructions as to scope of operations will, of course, come from me. Meanwhile
you should prepare remainder of Division for despatch, but we do not propose to send more
troops to Abadan till Turkey shows her hand, though it may be advisable to send a first
reinforcement to Basidu as a near support. If political situation presages war the whole
Division would be wanted and land transport would become necessary. With this in view you
might think it convenient to move Division gradually by rail and sea to Karachi, where
presumably you would be better able to equip with mule transport. Admiralty requested to
make arrangements for disembarkation with Naval Gommander-in-C'hief. Shall be glad to
have a full expression of your views.
No. 11.
Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 7th October 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
In reply to your telegram of 5th October 1 in which you ask for a full expression of my
views upon the Abadan project, I venture to put forward following considerations after
consulting Commander-in-Chief. It appears tons perfectly clear that the policy of Turkey,
which is not in a position to give real material assistance to the enemy, is dominated by