"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [و‎‎٦‎٥] (٢٥٦/١٣٢)

Germany, whose aim is to create a situation in which it will appear that Turkey is the object
of aggression of one or more Christian Powers. Violations of neutrality, as in case of Goeben,
are too technical to be understood by the Mahomedan masses, but the presence of belligerent
ships and the dis embarkation of troops in Turkish waters are facts of which the provocative
character are apparent to all. That such provocation should be given by Indian ships or
troops will create a bad effect in India and Afghanistan and must be to play into the hands
of Germany. I agree with Sir L. Mallet that at present moment, presence of three of our
ships in the Shatt-el-Arab is not defensible from an international point of view, but to send
troops into these neutral waters would probably be met by firing on our ships from the Fort
at Fao. Materially this would do us no harm, but if we took no action our prestige in the
Gulf would vanish, while if we retaliated we should place ourselves entirely in the wrong.
Disembarkation at Abadan presents no difficulty from a military point of view, but to do
so will be to walk deliberately into a trap not unskilfully laid for us. Before any final
decision to disembark troops at Abadan is taken, 1 trust His Majesty’s Government will
consider very carefully the above aspect of the question and particularly effect which it is
likely to have upon the attitude of Mahomedans in India, which is at present very satis
factory in every way. It is quite clear nothing can really secure safety of oil works except
the occupation of Abadan, but we see no reason to anticipate an attack upon them and we
doubt their value being so great as to outweigh consequences of an apparent attack by us on
Turkey. Again, the occupation of Abadan by a large military force would almost certainly
evoke "a protest by Persia, and in the event of hostilities with Turkey would constitute a
violation of neutrality of Persia, and would afford a pretext to Turkey for the extension of the
frontier at the expense of Persia. If, on the other hand, object in view is merely to
demonstrate at the head of the Gulf, other alternatives present themselves.
To land troops at Bassidu would be known immediately all over the Gulf, and would
create an immense impression. To this there could be no possible political objection, but from
a military point of view the difficulties of water supply on the island are almost insuperable.
After Bassidu, Bahrein is politically the nearest approach to British territory in the Gulf,
and there seems to be no serious objections to this alternative. r ! he Sheikh is old and not
likely to be obstructive, if the situation were explained to him. There is also an advantage
in favour of Bahrein in the fact of our having a force there would strengthen our hands and
assist our overtures to Bin Saood and the Sheikh of Katr. From a military point of view only
objection to Bahrein is difficulty of embarking and disembarking troops, owing to shallowness
of the water, but this could be mitigated by plentiful supply of boats. I propose to send
Sir P. Cox as political officer with any expedition to the Gulf, since his knowledge of the
Chiefs and of Gulf politics is unique.
No.,12.
Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey, dated 6th October 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
Military attache had a long interview with Minister of War yesterday, from which he
derived the impression that his Excellency had ambitious schemes in the Arab world and in
Egypt. These may perhaps refer more to the i uture, and possibly measures are now being
taken so as to prepare for the eventuality of Great Britain being worsted in war with
Germany ; meanwhile the way is being paved indirectly for present or future action. During
the conversation, Minister of M ar disclaimed any intention on the part of the Turks of
initiating, themselves, any offensive movements against Egypt, and pointed out that ordinary
Syrian garrison had not been reinforced. He said that, as in the case of other troops within
the Empire, Syrian garrison had been fully mobilised. It was being equipped with necessary
transport animals, Ac., on a war scale, and it was being carefully trained with the help of the
officers of the German mission as elsewhere throughout Turkey. Everything, he said,
depended on the political situation, for which he was not responsible individually, and it was
quite possible that the Syrian army corps might finally be moved in another direction, even,
perhaps, to Constantinople. He scouted the idea of individual Germans undertaking-
enterprises against the Suez Canal or elsewhere, but lie admitted that proposals had certainly
been made to the Bedouin tribes to enlist their sympathies as supporters of the Empire in all
eventualities. He defended the concentration of stores at Maan, Nablus, and Jerusalem, and
he added that no troops, but only gendarmes had been moved in the direction of Gaza.
Nevertheless, he could not deny that some of the measures taken were certainly precautionary
against Great Britain, and in justification of this, he pointed to the entrance of British
men-of-war into the Shatt-el-Arab, to the arrival of Indian troops in Egypt, and to the
presence of the British fleet in Turkish territorial waters outside the Dardanelles. Military
attache said that, as far as the action of the fleet and of His Majesty s Government were
concerned, this was due to infringement of neutrality by Turks, and Great Britain certainly
had not the slightest intention of making any aitack upon Turkey. It was quite ridiculous
to suppose that the arrival of Indian troops in .Egypt had anything to do with hostility to
Turkey. Minister of War at once advanced such arguments as that Turkey had maintained
her neutrality ; that German officers and men on auxiliary ships were entirely under Turkish
control, indeed they were in the Turkish service. Military attache said that I urks could
not be surprised that Great Britain should be preoccupied if Turkish troops were assembled
further south than Jerusalem or Beersheba on the one side, or Maan on the othei - .
No, 13.
Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey, dated 6th October 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
His Majesty’s consul at Basra telegraphs to-day as follows: —
‘■Tali says that he must obey the orders which lie has received. He has communicated a
copy of these to me. They are to the effect that the whole of the fehatt-el-Arab and sea
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