تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎٨] (٤٧٣/٤١٩)

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(c.) An Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs to be appointed; diplomatic
representation, subject to proviso that Egyptian foreign policy shall not
conflict with British.
(d.) The army of occupation of course to remain, and martial law to be abolished
so soon as an Indemnity Act, applicable both to Egyptians and to
foreigners, can be passed, either by resorting to the consent of the Powers
ad hoc, or, if they can be brought into force, under the operation of the
draft judicature laws. It would be a matter for consideration whether
the abolition of martial law should also be made conditional upon the
promulgation and bringing into effect, with the necessary consents, of
these last-mentioned laws. This might be found somewhat difficult to
justify.
(e.) A special regime for foreign officials in the Egyptian Government to be
established; provision to be made to regulate more closely the number of
}x>sts available for foreigners.
9. ' If the negotiations are broken off on the ground that, after consideration, His
Majesty's Government is unable to see its way to acquiescing in the abolition of the
protectorate, in the general terms of Lord Milner’s report, an embarrassing situa
tion will arise. The impression will be created throughout the world that the
Egyptian problem has been seriously mismanaged, and the view that the British
Government is chargeable with a breach of faith will be generally entertained,
particularly in Egypt. The task that would devolve upon the British Administration
in Egypt would be one of almost insurmountable difficulty, and would be highly
distasteful to many of those concerned. It would probably prove impossible to
constitute a Ministry, and it may be anticipated that it would be necessary tp resort
to direct military government. In the long run His Majesty’s Government would
almost certainly be driven to return to its present attitude, but in very much less
favourable circumstances.
10 . It is true that this forecast largely rests upon the assumption that it is
impossible for the British Government, by adopting a programme of popular reform,
to carry on the Administration in Egypt with an adequate measure of popular
consent if the wealthy and educated classes are against us. And it may be suggested
that this supposition is erroneous, and that such a policy is a possible one. It may,
for example, be asked whether it would not be possible to make such a bid for the
support of the fellaheen that the opposition of the other classes of the population
could be ignored.
11 . I am strongly of opinion that no such policy is a possible one.
12. In the first place, it might prove somewhat difficult when one came down to
details to construct a programme of icasonable legislative measures which would be
likely to make any very strong appeal to the peasant class. This is not a matter on
which I can claim to speak with special knowledge. But I apprehend that the main
concern of the fellaheen at the present time is to be relieved from the burden of rents
fixed on the basis of a high price of cotton. This is a presumably temporary
phenomenon.
13. Assuming, however, that an agrarian programme could be constructed of
such a nature that it would secure the support of the peasantry, the question arises
by whom that programme is to be carried out. It is to be remembered that such a
programme would, by hypothesis, have to be initiated at a time of great anti-British
political excitement. It might be difficult, if not impossible, in these circumstances
to find Ministers, a Legislature, or even the necessary Egyptian officials, to put it into
efiect.
14. It may not be out of place in this connection for me to submit some
observations upon the nature of the Nationalist movement, as I see it.
15. It is, I believe, a mistake to think of the population of Egypt as being
divided into two sharply separated classes—on the one hand, the fellaheen and the
working classes without political sentiments, and on the other, a comparatively small
wealthy or educated class reacting readily to political propaganda.
16. The people of Egypt should on the contrary be regarded as a comparatively
homogeneous population, the various classes of which are closely united by ties of
relationship, neighbourhood and similarity of interest. The educated class has at
its, disposition very various means of acting on the passions and feelings of the
people in general. This class itself is profoundly influenced by the prestige of
Europe. The desire to imitate Europe is illustrated and symbolised by the general