تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎٨‎٠] (٤٧٣/١٦١)

13
which the Egyptian people had been called upon to make, entitled them to the
particular consideration of Great Britain. The idea of definitely regulating the
relations between Great Britain and Egypt had, indeed, already been mooted by
Rushdi Pasha, the Prime Minister, at the end of 1917.
This movement received great encouragement from the publication, in the
beginning of November 1918, of the Anglo-French declaration regarding Syria and
Mesopotamia, which announced that Great Britain and France contemplated the
complete and definitive enfranchisement of the peoples liberated from Turkish
oppression and the institution among them of national Governments deriving their
authority from the initiative and free choice of the people themselves. The High
Commissioner (Sir P. Wingate) did not fail to point out that the policy indicated in
this declaration would have its repercussion in Egypt. Moreover, the Egyptians had
recently witnessed the establishment of an independent kingdom in Arabia, which
they had always regarded as far behind their own half-occidentalised country in
civilisation and development.
At the very moment when these ideas were being widely discussed, public opinion
was greatly stirred by the revelation of a confidential memorandum, which was
interpreted as denying to Egypt the privileges of self-government advocated for other
less advanced communities. A special commission to consider constitutional reform
had been nominated at the beginning of 1918, and Sir Wm. Brunyate, the Acting
Financial Adviser, was requested by this commission to draw up a note to serve as a
basis for their discussions. He was invited, in particular, to examine the principle of
giving the foreign colonies some share in the legislation of the country, which
might render more acceptable to the Powers the surrender of the practical veto
exercised by them under the Capitulations over a considerable field of legislature.
Sir Wm. Brunyate’s note gave great offence to the Prime Minister, to whom it was
presented in the middle of November 1918, and, though intended only as a basis for
confidential discussion, its contents became generally known. A storm of protest was
aroused by a project which was interpreted as assigning only consultative functions to
an Egyptian Legislative Assembly, while bestowing all legislative power on a Senate
in which the officially-nominated members and a group of elected foreigners would
constitute the majority.
Simultaneously with the commission above referred to, another commission had
been sitting for many months to consider the judicial reforms which would become
necessary in the event of the abolition of the Capitulations. Although this commission
had issued no report, a general impression prevailed that it contemplated the super-
session of the Mixed Tribunals by new Courts in which the English language and
British legal procedure would predominate—a measure which would entail disabilities
on the native Bar and paralyse the foreign advocates who had hitherto used the French
language. This assumption tended to confirm the hostility of the legal profession to
any extended affirmation of British control.
On the 13th November, 1918, Zaghlul Pasha, with two other leaders of the
advanced Nationalist group, paid a visit to the High Commissioner and expressed their
desire to go to London in order to put forward a programme of “ complete autonomy
for Egypt. Simultaneously, the Prime Minister, Rushdi Pasha, proposed that he
should himself, together with Adli Pasha Yeghen, the Minister of Education, proceed
to London to discuss the affairs of Egypt, a plan which he stated had the full approval
of the Sultan. The contention of these Ministers was that the Peace Congress would
give official consecration to the Protectorate, and that therefore its nature could not be
left undefined. Under the Turkish suzerainty Egypt had had certain rights, and they
desired to know what their rights would be as against Great Britain under the
Protectorate.
Sir R. Wingate reported these proposals to the Foreign Office, and was informed
in reply that “ no useful purpose would be served by allowing Nationalist leaders to
come to London,” and that the visit of the two Ministers would not be “ opportune” at
that moment. The Foreign Secretary explained that, owing to the fact that he and
other Ministers would be absent from London in connection with the peace
negotiations, they would “ not be able to devote sufficient time and attention to problems
of Egyptian internal reform.” In these circumstances the Ministers were invited to
“defer their visit.” Rushdi Pasha gave the High Commissioner to understand that he
regarded the refusal of His Majesty's Government to give him an immediate hearing
as involving an interpretation of the meaning of the Protectorate to which he could not
agree and tendered his resignation. 'There were no doubt obvious difficulties in the
way of discussing such questions with the Egyptian Ministers at a moment of high
political pressure, when the Peace Conference was about to open, but it would appear