أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎٤‎١] (٣٤٨/٨١)

3
with his colleagues, repeated his views of the situation. In this second telegram he had
pointed out that the Oilician incident was a case apart, and ought to be dealt with on
its own merits by itself. What the Allies in Constantinople had to face and to adjust
their action to was the wider issue raised by the intention of the Nationalists to resist
a drastic Peace, and the probable intention of the Peace Conference to impose such a
Peace. He repeated, therefore, the suggestion which had already found place in his
previous telegram that the Allied occupation of Constantinople was the inevitable local
solution.
Upon the receipt of this second telegram, the Allied Conference had again
considered the matter yesterday, and they had despatched a telegram to the Allied
High Commissioners in the following sense :—
1 hey recognised that the “ bloc ” policy was impracticable, since the main condition
ol its adoption, namely the offer to the Turk of a Peace which should leave him the
greater part of his former possessions or power in Europe and Asia Minor was not and
could not be forthcoming. They stated accordingly that, in their opinion, the Capital
ought to be occupied at once by the Allied forces ; that the Turkish Government should
be required to dismiss Mustapha Kemal; that the Turkish Government should be
informed that the military occupation of Constantinople would continue until the
terms of the Peace Treaty had been accepted and put into execution, and lastly that,
if there was any recurrence of outrages, the proposed terms of the Peace Treaty, which
were indicated in outline to the High Commissioners, would be rendered even more
severe, and the concessions already made would be withdrawn.
I explained to the Ambassador that the military occupation of Constantinople
would include the occupation of the Turkish War Office, and the control and censorship
of all military orders or despatches issuing therefrom, with such -other military
measures as might be thought desirable by the Allied commanders, but that it would
not include the general assumption of civil administration in Constantinople.
I he High Commissioners had been asked to consult together at once, both as to
the measures proposed and as to any other steps which, in their judgment, ought to be
taken either to secure the submission of the Turk or to protect the Christian minorities
in the various parts of the Turkish territories from further outrage or attack.
Such, 1 said, was the situation as it existed at this moment, and the reasons for
which, at the instance of the Conference, 1 had thus fully explained the case to the
American Ambassador were these :—
1. So far as Cilicia was concerned, the Americans were directly interested in what
had happened.
2. Although the American Government had desisted from the Peace Conference
and had refrained from giving any indication of their future policy with regard to the
Turkish Empire, there were many who were reluctant to believe that the American
interest in that part of the world had altogether abated, and who even thought that,
at a future date, America might be willing to assume some share of the responsibility,
which at one time it was hoped that she would voluntarily undertake now.
3. The Powers, although they were resolved to take this action by themselves, did
not wish to take it behind the back of the American Government or without at least
informing the American Government of what they were about to do.
It was not for me to formulate to the Ambassador any request, much less any
demand. His Government would decide on their own responsibility what to do
or what not to do. Geographical conditions, might render their participation, even if
they were willing to undertake it, difficult or impossible. But, for our part, we would
gladly welcome their co-operation in a policy which was international in the strictest
sense of the term, and the consequences of which could not fail to have a far-reaching
effect.
In conclusion, I offered to dictate a summary of the statement which I had made
to the Ambassador, which summary, if it were accepted by him, would constitute an
accurate record of what had passed between us, and could be made the basis of the
communication which he informed me that he intended to make
Government.
The present memorandum has been so drawn up and approved.
Foreign Office, March G, 1920.
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