أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎٣‎٨] (٣٤٨/٧٥)

[Tliis Document is the Property oi His Britannic Majesty s (joyeminent.J
EASTERN. [November 12.J
CONFIDENTIAL. Sbctioh 1.
[151671] No. 1.
Memorandum.
WITHIN an hour of the arrival of the French Presidential party in London,
M. Pichon attended, by appointment, to see me in the Foreign Office. He was
accompanied by M. de Fleuriau. Our conversation, which lasted for more than an
hour, covered all the more important questions connected with the Near and
Middle East.
After a mutual exchange of friendly sentiments and sincere intentions, M. Pichon
proceeded to describe the situation as it was in Paris.
The information which he gave about the state of negotiations with the Emir
Feisal -was much more sanguine than that which had been reported to us by our own
informants. I could not help thinking that it was considerably coloured by hope. He
said nothing about the suspension of negotiations between the Emir and M. Clemenceau ;
on the contrary, he described their correspondence and intercourse as being of the
most amicable character. He said nothing of the appeal of the Emir to the Peace
Conference, although at the moment I had that appeal in my possession. He said
nothing about any difficulties arising out of the military evacuation, which had already
begun; nor did he say anything about the prospect of danger in the wider field of
Syria as a whole. Instead, he represented the Emir as gradually receding from the
position which he had at first taken up ; as having put forward extravagant pretensions,
which were now being watered down ; and as realising by degrees that he had taken
himself much too seriously, and probably might not find the support, even in his own
country, upon which he relied. M. Pichon evidently desired to give me the impression
that the negotiations with Emir Feisal would ultimately eventuate in the manner
which the French desired.
I did not dispute this rosy estimate of the situation, although it was far from
corresponding with the information I had received from Paris. The important thing
to my mind, was that the French and the Emir should not split asunder, and should
continue their conversations to a point at which k some sort of agreement might be
arrived at.
The French Foreign Minister was emphatic in his declaration that any suspicion
of our intentions and attitude had been removed, and in his satisfaction at the evidence
to that effect which we had supplied, both to his own Government and to the Emir.
He clearly did not think that the case was one in which we, at any rate, were likely to
quarrel.
While reciprocating his hopes, I expressed the strongest possible view that the
real danger was that a situation might arise in which the Emir, if he could not come
to terms with the French, would so manage matters that our two nations were brought
into disagreement, if not into collision, while he remained outside as tertius gaudens.
M. Pichon went on to say that, America having disappeared from the scene as a
factor in the settlement of the East, and all chance of an American mandate for any
portion of the Turkish Empire having, in his opinion, vanished, there remained only
two parties whose interests had seriously to be considered and reconciled, namely,
Great Britain and France. From this point of view, he was authorised to say that his
Government were prepared to enter into confidential discussions with us as soon as we
pleased. Either M. Olemenceau would come here alone, or he would come with
M. Pichon, or he would depute the latter. In any case, conversations must take place,
and an understanding must be arrived at, before the Peace Conference addressed itself
to the Turkish question.
1 accepted with gratification both the necessity of such an interchange of views
and the desirability of a meeting with M. Clemenceau. I pointed out to M. Pichon
that, quite apart from the larger question of peace with Turkey, there were matters
connected with the Emir Feisal’s case which could be settled only by some such
discussion. There was, for instance, the question of the eastern boundary line of the
coastal area in Syria which we were now evacuating, in order that we might be replaced
by the French. This had been defined in Paris as the Sykes-Picot line. Had the
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