أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [ظ‎‎١‎١‎٦] (٢٩٠/٢٣٢)

2
to the Bolshevik menace, and, secondly, what steps could be taken
to meet it. He proposed to review the position m the val ^ )US
theatres in turn and to ask the representatives of the India Ottice,
War Office and Admiralty to tell the Conference frankly how they
regarded the situation in each case.
To take Khorassan first. General Malleson was at Meshed with
a force which was not considerable in number somethimr unt ei
^500—but with supports strewn along the eastern frontier
Persia. He was there more as an outpost than as a nuhtaiy
commander. He might be compared to a man on a watch-tower.
It had always been contemplated that if his position were seriously
threatened from a military point of view his force should be
withdrawn. At a recent meeting the Cabinet had taken alarm at
the expenditure involved in our commitments in various theatres
in the Middle East, and had somewhat hastily arrived at certain
decisions, of which one was that General Malleson s force should be
altogether withdrawn. He had pleaded at this meeting that action
should be deferred until the Government of India, who were bearing
a share of the expenditure, could be consulted. The Secretary of
State for India had consulted the Viceroy on the 10th February,
and in his reply of the 21st February Lord Chelmsford had
emphasised the political importance of retaining a British foice in
Khorassan, and had pointed out the grave results that would attend
their proposed withdrawal. At the same time it could not he denied
that the figure of 6| million pounds, which was the estimated
cost of the retention of General Malleson’s force, would be exceed
ingly difficult to justify to the Cabinet. This figure had taken him
completely by surprise, and he could not help wondering whether
it could really be the case that a minimum expenditure of over
6 millions must necessarily be incurred. He would be glad to
know more precisely the exact nature of the charges which made
up this alarming total, and would ask the India Office representative
for fuller details. He pointed out that it would not be sufficient to
inform the Cabinet that the Government of India would agree to
pay the “normal proportion” of the*expenditure involved. He
would ask for a definite statement of the actual amount which they
would be prepared to accept. He adhered to the view which he had
. consistently expressed, that the withdrawal of General Malleson’s
force at this juncture would be an act of supreme folly, and he was
prepared to bring great pressure to bear upon the Cabinet to
sanction its retention, provided that he were in a position to give
fuller details of' the expenditure involved, and to say that the
Government of India were sufficiently impressed with the gravity
of the position in Khorassan to bear an equal share with the
Imperial Government in the expenses of General Malleson’s Mission.
Turning now to the south-east corner of. the Caspian, there were
reports that the Bolsheviks were contemplating an advance through
the country of the Yamut Turcomans towards Gumbad Kabus,
with Asterabad as their main objective. One telegram even spoke
obscurel) of their intention of marching across to the Afghan
frontier by a desert route south of Meshed. He could hardly credit
this report, though he fully realised that the Bolsheviks were quite
likely to aim at Asterabad, which was situated on what might be
called the neck of Persia.
Vossugh-ud-Daulah had enquired whether we would advise him
to send a representative to the Bolshevik headquarters at Karasu
or Gumbad Kabus to ask their intentions. His own .inclination
would be to reply at once that there could be no objection. It
seemed to him quite a reasonable course for the Persian Government
to take to send a representative to ask the Bolshevik commander
what was the meaning of this movement. Persia was not at war
with the Soviet Government, and had every right to enquire into
the motives of an apparently hostile force which was violating
Persian territory.