أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [ظ‎‎١‎١‎٠] (٢٩٠/٢٢٠)

4
of Waziri connection with it. He thought that there was somt inu
in the criticism which had been made to him on the tn ,a Ct
proposals, that if we retained responsibility for Southern *yur ( istan
it would be difficult, if not impossible, for us to treat it di t rt _ 11 ^ y
from Mesopotamia. The Mesopotamian Arab would certainIv draw
comparisons between the relations of His Majesty s (to\ ei nnu nl
with the Kurdish Aghas on the one hand, and with the Arab of
Mesopotamia on the other. If the Kurd were to he allowed to
control his own revenue and expenditure, subject only to Bntish
advice, would not the Arab demand similar freedom ?
With regard to the second question, he wished to remind the
Conference that the position had changed considerably during tin*
last few weeks. We had hitherto contemplated a palisade composed
of the Armenian State and of a French-controlled ( ilicia which
would effectually separate the Turks from the Kurds. But during
the recent discussions we had found that the French had taken alarm
at the very serious attacks to which they had been subjected in
Cilicia, which had resulted in large numbers of Armenians being
killed. They had consequently given up all idea of extending
their sphere of influence in Cilicia to the confines of the Armenian
State. When they were asked how they intended to help the Allies
to fulfil the pledges of Europe and their own about the protection
of the Christian minority, they merely replied that they would make
themselves responsible. How they were to do this without troops he
was at a loss to understand.
At the request of the Chairman, Colonel Gribbon indicated on a
map the approximate boundary of French influence so far as it had
been decided up to date. It was clear from this that there would be
a corridor passing between the Armenian State and the French
sphere along which Turkish connection with Kurdistan would he free
to establish itself if the Kurds really desire it.
The Chairman asked whether in view of this probability it
would still be practicable to exclude the predominantly Kurdish
areas from the Turkish Empire under the Peace Treaty.
Mr. Vansittart pointed out that the recognition of Turkish
sovereignty in the Kurdish areas would be the death-blow to
Armenian independence. The new Armenian State would find it
difficult enough to establish itself, even if it were onlv to he in
contact with the Turks on its western boundary. If Turkish
influence were to be allowed to'extend right up to the Persian
frontier the very existence of Armenia would be seriously threatened.
Colonel Gribbon did not see why Turkish rule should not end at
the Euphrates, east of which Kurdish autonomy might be recognised
if they wanted it. The complete evacuation of all Turkish troops and
officials from the Kurdish areas might be included in the conditions
under which the Turks are allowed to remain in Constantinople. He
presumed that some such stipulation would, in any case, be*necessarv
to ensure the evacuation of the territory which was to form the new
Armenian estate. If it were really the case that the Kurds would
welcome the return of the Turks, it did not upp^r
prevent this, but we should at least give the Kurds a chance of
establishing their independence if we cleared the Turk out of the
Kurdish areas by the Peace Treaty.
Sir Arthur Ilirtzel said that the establishment of an auton 'inous
Kurdistan would be very much more difficult now that the ench
had decided to withdraw into the Arab areas. He adhered to his
opinion that the best step towards the achievement of an eventual
autonomous Kurdistan would be the setting up of Kurdish S tes in
Southern Kurdistan and the Bohtan. the areas over which we could
exercise effective control.
Major Noel had assured the Conference that as long as it was
made perfectly clear to the Kurds that we had no intention of