أوراق اللجنة الشرقية التابعة لمجلس الحرب [و‎‎٤‎٦] (٥٤٤/٩١)

and these he considered should continue to be under the War Office.
The control, however, of operations and Missions in Iranscaspia
and Meshed, and towards Central Asia, which seemed also to be
drifting into the hands of the War Office, he was disposed to think
fell more properly under the Indian Government. lhat that
Government were evidently of the same opinion was shown by the
fact that they had, in the course ot the last day or two, held up
certain instructions which had been issued by the War Office, after
a Conference on Eastern Affairs, held under the direction of the Prime
Minister at 10, Downing Street, the previous Monday, to Major Redl
to endeavour to interrupt the Transcaspian Railway. His own view
was that this particular theatre should not be under the War Office
but under the Indian Government. It had been agreed at tbe end
of last meeting of the C< mrnittee that the question of Sir P. Sykes
should be held over until the Secretary of State for India could be
present. He understood that the Committee were in agreement
that the operations in South Persia should be under a separate
military commander, and had accept d the principle that Syk*;S was
not competent to command any considerable military force.
Mr. Montagu said that he was not present when this agreement
was arrived at by the Committee, and he did not concur in it for
reasons which he would explain'presently.
The Chairman said it remained to be settled whether the officer
in chief command in South Persia should be under General Marshall
or under the Commander-in-Chief in India. H e was inclined to
think that the latter would be the better arrangement. The position
presented this anomaly :—
1. That Sykes commanded a Persian force which was not
recognised by the Persian Government.
2. That ho also had certain regular Indian troops under his
command.
3. That he was also a political officer, whose views were some
times at variance with those of his political chief, name]} 7 ,
our Minister at Teheran.
He, himself, thought that if a new military commander were sent
ftom India, he should be instructed to consult Sykes whenever he
thought it necessary or desirable that the South Persia Rifles should
co-operate with the troops under his own command.
General Macdonogh said that the Chairman’s view was almost
identical with that held by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff;
and, further, that he had been under the impression that at the last
meeting it had been decided that a new commander should be
appointed f"r South Persia.
The Chairman said that it had been recorded in the minutes of
the last meeting that the consideration of this question should stand
over until Mr. Montagu could be present.
General Macdonogh said that the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff's view was that a British General should be sent over to South
Persia to command the troops in that area, but should be directly
under the Commander-in-Chief in India, and direct operations under
the orders of the Indian Government; that he should not command
the South Persia Rifles, and that General Marshall should be
responsible for Dizful, Shustar. and the Hamad;m road.
The Chairman suggested that in that case Bukhtiariland should
also be within General Marshall’s sphere.
Mr. Oliphant thought that there would be no objection to this
proposal on the part of the Foreign Office.
Mr. Montagu said that if the hypothesis on which the Com
mittee was working were accepted he agreed, but that now that
pressure could be exerted upon the Persian Government by our
holding the Hamadan-Kasvin line he thought we must either form
an alliance with that Government or regard Persia as a military
[365—14] H