مجموعة ١١١/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. كرمانشاه - يوميّات سياسية." [ظ‎‎٤] (٧٥١/٩)

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(B) Kurdistan Affairs.
5. The most important question to which reference should be made in this
diary is the uncertain position in Central Kurdistan. At present Kurdistan ^
divided into three zones :—
(a) The northern zone, which lies south of Lake Urumieh (Rezaieh), which
lies within Russian-occupied Persia. This area lies outside this
consular district and outside the area which British military forces
have been patrolling from their Sanandaj headquarters. Little
precise information is known regarding conditions theie.
(b) The central zone, which is situated to the south of zone (a) comprises
the whole area adjoining the Iraq frontier between Zohab and
Sardasht and reaching as far north-east as Diwandarreh and as tar
south as Ruansar, but not including Sanandaj. In this zone Kurds
(includino’ several influential Iraqi Kurds) have ousted the I eisian
police, gendarmes, tax-gatherers, customs officials, in spectors of the
Department of Agriculture, &c., and have apparently set up a
provisional administration of their own. Strangely enough, this
Kurdish effort at self-administration seems to have worked fairly well
so far; there are indications, however, that jealousies have already
broken out among the Kurdish leaders, and that the latter aie likely
to start trouble among themselves soon. If this is really the case, it
may explain the apparent slowness of the Persian authorities’ attempt
to regain control in Central Kurdistan. They may be waiting foi
inevitable dissensions to appear among the Kurds, for the Kuids
present apparently “ united front ’ to break up and for a convenient
occasion to play oft some Kurdish leaders against others.
(c) The southern zone of Kurdistan (including Sanandaj); this comprises
Persian Kurdistan not included in zones {a) and {b) above. I he
Persian Government at present exercises in this zone authority which
is more nominal than real; indeed, brigandage is rife in many parts of
it and real security can be enjoyed only where British Indian military
patrols constantly operate.
6. In the first week of October the Kurdish leaders inflicted at ^aqqiz a
defeat on a Persian force which included a few tanks and armoured cars; the
Kurds rapidly advanced towards Sanandaj, which they aimed at occupying and
makino- their “ capital.” The small British force at Sanandaj might have been
overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers, but the officei commanding the
detachment succeeded in persuading the Kurds to remain at a distance to the
north and west of Sanandaj. Dopes were held out that the Persian authorities
would in the near future meet Kurdish leaders and that differences would be
settled by negotiations; the prospect of this, more than anything else, probably
influenced the Kurds when they agreed to keep away from Sanandaj. There is,
however, so much mutual distrust between Kurds and Persians that it seems to
me that, unless the negotiators are encouraged and actually helped to ‘ ‘ get
together ” in order to discuss their differences, e.g., by giving them safe-conducts,
the negotiations may be indefinitely delayed. It is to be hoped that a meeting will
take place very soon, and that a just settlement of the dispute will result
therefrom. General Shahbakhti is'being requested to endeavour to secure a
peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem, but his blunt manner and forceful
methods seem to be more suited to the battlefield than to the conference table, and
there is thus some danger that negotiations (if they do take place) may not produce
the desired satisfactory results if General Shahbakhti handles this delicate
nicittGr
7 * jt is now known that General Moghadldam made no serious effort to
comply with the British General Officer Commanding’s orders to take rapid and
energetic action against the 6.000 to 8,000 persons illegally in possession of arms.
In fact, it is known that, as fast as rifles were recovered, Moghaddam reissued
them (on payment of large sums which he pocketed) to villagers who clamoured
to him for arms for their self-defence; no steps were taken to ensure that the arms
thus handed over would not be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes.
Similarly, many officers and men sent out to disarm brigands became brigands
themselves or deserted and sold their rifles at the first convenient opportunity.