مجموعة ٦/ ٢١(٢) "المملكة العربية السعودية: العلاقات مع حكومة بريطانيا: المفوضية السعودية في لندن والوزير البريطاني في جدة. تمديد معاهدة جدة." [و‎‎٢‎٩‎٣] (٧٦١/٥٨٥)

3
that His Majesty will oppose any such suggestions by pleading the force of
opinion in Saudi Arabia, and to this argument His Majesty’s Government can,
in the last resort, only reply by emphasising the force of public opinion in this
country. While therefore you will press very strongly for the omission or
modification of this passage, I see no alternative but to authorise you to accept
n it as it stands if, in your judgment, the success of an otherwise promising
negotiation would be jeopardised by further opposition on this point.
11. Sir John Simon, in paragraph 4 of his despatch No. 452 of the
13th December, 1934, referred to a suggestion by Sir George Maxwell that action
might be taken to bring Saudi Arabia into the orbit of the efforts being made by
the League of Nations to end slavery, at least to the extent of securing her
accession to article 2 (a) of the International Slavery Convention, 1926. After
taking into full consideration the general indifference of the Saudi Government,
as reported by you from time to time since the issue of Sir John Simon’s
instructions on this point, to the League of Nations and its activilies, I am of
opinion that it will be preferable, at any rate for the present, that His Majesty’s
Government, who at least have something with which to bargain in the proposed
abandonment of their right of manumission, shall continue to deal with the matter
as an Anglo-Saudi question, and that the idea of securing the accession of Saudi
Arabia to article 2 (a) of the International Slavery Convention of 1926 shall not
be pursued at the present time, though it may be possible to revert to it,
independently of the present negotiations, at some future date. In any case it
may be hoped that other influences, such as the force of public opinion in Europe
generally and among enlightened Moslems in other countries, may gradually
induce the Saudi Government to make effective any regulations which they adopt
on this subject.
12. The question whether, if you are able to reach an agreement with King
Abdul Aziz in regard to the draft Saudi regulation, the eventual abandonment
by His Majesty’s Government of their right of manumission shall be made
independently, or as part of an arrangement for the prolongation of the Treaty
of Jedda, is distinct from that of the main issue dealt with in this despatch.
Generally speaking, however, and subject to such views as you may derive from
your conversations with King Abdul Aziz, the best method will be to adopt the
suggestion originally made by you, that, when certain matters, of which this
question of slavery is the most important, have been satisfactorily settled, the
Treaty of Jedda shall be formally prolonged by an exchange of notes. Both
parties would undertake therein not to exercise for a period of, say, seven years,
their right under article 8 of the treaty to denounce it on six months’ notice,
while His Majesty’s Government would, in the same exchange of notes, record
their renunciation of the right of manumission which they have maintained under
the letters exchanged between the late Sir Gilbert Clayton and King Abdul Aziz
at the time of the original conclusion of the treaty.
13. On the other hand, should your negotiations with King Abdul Aziz on
such subjects as that of the south-eastern frontiers make sufficient progress to
justify you in recommending the conclusion of an entirely new treaty to replace
the Treaty of Jedda of 1927, it would still be possible to fall back on the first of
the two courses of action suggested in paragraph 12.
14. Alternatively, so little progress may be made with the settlement of the
other questions in dispute that it may be impossible or undesirable either to renew
the Treaty of Jedda in the manner ^proposed, or to conclude a fresh treaty. In
that event I shall be prepared, on your recommendation, to consider the conclusion
of the proposed arrangement for the abandonment by His Majesty’s Government
of their right of manumission in return for the promulgation of the proposed
legislation; and, in that case, the arrangement would have to be incorporated in
a separate exchange of notes dealing with that subject only.
15. It may be that during your visit to Riyadh no suitable opportunity will
present itself for you to discuss this question with the King in person. In that
case, the question will arise whether you will take any initiative in raising it on
your return to Jedda, if the Saudi Government do not themselves raise it. On
the whole, I incline to the view that the balance of argument is in favour of
proceeding with the matter, even if the Saudi Government do not themselves
revive the question. I am, however, prepared to leav^ it to your discretion, in
the light of the circumstances existing at the time, whether to take any such
initiative or not. If you are in any doubt on the point, you may seek my further
[531 aa—1] b 2