"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎١‎٣‎٢] (٤٥٤/٢٦٨)

MR. CHAMBERLAIN’S VIEWS
239
India were well aware of General Nixon’s intentions and were
responsible if any delay occurred in informing the Secretary of
State. The Commander-in-Chief in India agreed with General
Nixon’s views in regard to the reasons for and importance of
occupying Amara and Nasiriya, and considered that it ought
to be his first object to expel the Turks from the river Tigris
below Amara.
The telegram then went on to repeat Lord Crewe s telegram ot
the 24th May regarding the importance of protecting the
pipe-line and pointed out that this object would be achieved
by General Nixon’s movement on Amara ; which would also
enable General Nixon both to form a bettei opinion as to
whether the Turks were receiving reinforcements or not and to
judge the best time for an advance on Nasiriya, should he
consider this desirable later on.
On the 26th, General Nixon in his daily progress report,
which was as usual repeated to the India Office, stated that
General Townshend reported that by the 31st his arrangements
for an offensive movement from Qurna against Ruta would
be complete ; and General Nixon hoped that by the time
General Townshend had reorganised his river transport after
this offensive movement, clear orders would have reached him
regarding the policy to be followed in the matter of an advance
towards Amara. This telegram reached the India Office on the
27th May, the day that Mr. Austen Chamberlain succeeded
Lord Crewe as Secretary of State for India ; and on the next
day Mr. Chamberlain sent the following telegram to the
Viceroy . ^ ^ please see my predecessor’s telegram of the
24th April * I cannot give further instructions till 1 know
with what force he (Nixon) is advancing and immediate
objects contemplated. Our policy must depend P^t y on
local factors, forces locally available and resista
expected, and partly on situation elsewhere. If you
contemplate occupation of Amara I should like to know
what force Nixon considers necessary for i ts gams
during summer and how generally he proposes to distribute
his troops during summer months
The Viceroy replied on the 1st June
“ /General Nixon was instructed on the 27 th May
that his'first object is to expel Turks from lo ^ Jigns
below Amara, the reby securing the safety of Basra a
* This was the telegram given above saying that we must play a safe game
in Mesopotamia.