"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [ظ‎‎١‎٣‎١] (٤٥٤/٢٦٧)

238 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
offensive movement from Ourna had been referred to in a
telegram of his (i.e., Nixon’s) to India on the 24th April; and that
he had, on the 27th April in another telegram to India, stated
that he was attending to the organisation and preparations for
operations on the Tigris line. He stated that the enemy had
recently been strengthening their position on the Tigris about
Ruta, and that it was necessary to attack them there whether
the advance was continued beyond that spot or not.
General Nixon went on to say that unless we were prepared
to occupy Nasiriya and gain control of the powerful Arab
tribes of the western portion of the Basra vilayet, our attitude
at Basra could only be a defensive one—and he instanced the
battle of Shaiba as the result of such an attitude. In his
opinion, our safest policy was to take up a position at Nasiriya
or Suq ash Shuyukh with a line of communication by water;
and he asked for definite sanction to an advance on Nasiriya
as soon as water transport was available from the Tigris.
He pointed out that if this advance were delayed until after the
middle of July, the lack of water in the Hammar lake would
prevent our bringing up guns to force an opposed landing and
would, therefore, entail a march across one hundred and ten
miles of desert.
General Nixon concluded by saying that he did not contem
plate any advance beyond Amara and Nasiriya and that the
force at his disposal could effect the occupation of these two
places. He pointed out that another Turkish advance on
Ahwaz could not be prevented without the occupation of
Amara ; but that with Amara in British hands our troops could
eventually be withdrawn from Ahwaz and be set free for work
on either the Tigris or the Euphrates.
These several telegrams were not repeated to the India
Office at the time, but in replying on the 27th May to General
Nixon’s wire of the 25th May the Chief of the General Staff,
India, pointed out that the India Office must have received
a copy* of General Nixon’s instructions before Lord Crewe sent
his telegram of the 23rd May, which was not regarded in India
as conflicting with the general directions given General Nixon on
the 24th March, but rather as conveying instructions that no
reinforcements would be sent to Mesopotamia. As regards
Lord Crewe’s complaint of only being informed of the proposed
advance on Amara at the last moment, the Government of
* This copy, sent by mail but delayed in transit, did not come to the notice
of either Lord Crewe or General Barrow when the telegrams in ques 10