خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الوضع قبيل احتلال الحلفاء، وما بعده" [ظ‎‎٢‎٩‎٧] (٦٠٦/٥٩٤)

he think it probable that expulsion of Germans fron Iran would create
apprehension amongst Geman'colony in Afghanistan also and lead to their
withdrawal n
4c \.e realise that it may be difficult to dispel Russian suspicion
rn any co-operative plan dealing with Iran or Afghanistan and that, even if
we could spare the_(?_forces) joint (? move) into Iranmight greatly
® 1,1 ^gtben German influence at Angora. We therefore advise that pressure
m ine i rrst instance shouJ.d be by means of of (sic) economic pressure
(? by) Russia and ourselves leaving Iran with only one outlet through
xurkey which could (? scarcely) relieve economic strangle-hold. A part
of such ecanomic pressure would be withholding of all war supplies frcsn
iimerica or elsewhere destined to Iran.
We are encouraged by Tehran telegram No.591 of June 20th to
i?...rej.gn Office t,; hope that Germans in Iran are already apprehensive of
£he position and may (? require) little persuasion to move. ’ We.
ad-ccate early application of diplomatic andEconomic pressure steadily
ac first and increasingly later when attention of (? Russia) may be diverted
elsewhere. Situation must not be precipitated whereby Shah exercises
w»aiioexon on oil output which would necessitate military intervention cn
our part until the Syrian situation is cleared up, ( Until) this happens
sufficient troops will not be available to (? secure) Abadan,,
S * We do not think supersession of present trade dri.ve policy (? by)
■^.n^ of gradualiy increasiiig eccnomic pressure should present (? insuperable)
difficulties if new measures are correctly timed and applied with gradually
increasing force. ^ ?/e would in fact recommend continued and simultaneous
examination of trade Ripenings by U.K.C.C. and ourselves particularly new
that Japan has difficulty in maintaining her Gulf trade ' Thus (? we shall)
l?e better able to fill the gap when objective of removal of Germans is secured.
^ ; e had I fear femulated views before receipt of Cairo telegram ^*0.
TR>_,_2034 of June 50th. • V/e consider that uncertainty of Russian situation **£ UouukJ tkiA
indicates need for early action and firm policy in this area. ^.
bur CL&W
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