خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الوضع قبيل احتلال الحلفاء، وما بعده" [و‎‎٢‎٩‎٧] (٦٠٦/٥٩٣)

file c
jU.Xotted to External Department,
Copies circulated*
DECYPHER
0 P
TELEGRAM.
Cofa Ic
S.^c. jei(
From Government of India, External Affairs Department, to Secretary of
State for India.
Dated Simla* 19.05 hours, 6th July, 1941.
Received 22.30 hours, 6th July, 1941.
IMMEDIATE.
XXX
1>Ao\a3
3589, Addressed to Secretary of State for India, repeated to Tehran
telegram No.200 and Kabul telegram No.290, copy by Air Mail to Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf Bahrain.
Your telegram No.7505 of J une 25th. Policy in Central Asia. In
concert mth our military advisers v/e view problem presented by Iran and
Afghanistan* namely possible penetration of either or both of those countries
' by German forces, as one. We also regard front Extending from Syria to
Sin Kiang as one along which certain portions are more potentially dangerous
than others owing to ease of approach and possibilities which they offer for
development of comimnications toward India.
2. We will deal more specifically with Afghanistan and Sin Kiang on
lYrt ■ receipt of Fraser-Ty tier' s and Ship ton’s views - see our telegram s 3244 a nd
~ 5245 of June 30th. V/e think however that Iran is a key point in this fror
^ r ane mst emphasise that from a military point of view Iran is responsibiliP
of India and therefore our views must be taken into account. Iran offers
prizes of oilfields, nearer and better approaches for enemy, is.already
R. Mi I centre of German intrigue in Asia mid now harbours important Arab revolution-
CtfVf Jo TimAuI aries. It would be unsound to assume that Germany may not pea
^ ^ •“ two months reach Caucasus, that Soviet Russia may nr-: re quiesce in C ermr
demands, and that with oil at their disposal German forces could not move
far and fast and with Iran in prepared state would meet with little or no *
difficulty in. country where communicaticn(?s and) other facilities would
remain intact.
3o The German technique has followed following lines,. 1. Introduction
of specialists in form of key-men in industry; 2c formation by a cove of
propaganda agencies and fifth column organisations: 3. reinforcement oC
this (? advanced) guard by "tourists”; 4. occupation and development of
aerodromes to "protect" against aggression country concerned; 5. occupation
of country by land forces and its complete domination,
think that German, attempt to carry out this policy in Iraq •
just prevented by our action, that the first two stages have alreahy benn
iuJh $<& TcLka** .prepared in Iran and Afghanistan and the third stage is <
•Mtu. Ht.&qi Idealisation in (? Iran). In the event of
..%G-emans from taking possession of Caucasus o.i
importanoe that eastward passage through Iran or Afghanistan
4 7*** Germany and that potential hostility of
J I to effective minimum by depriving them of • ' '
Oll+dt+r) ability* Removal of these especially from Iran {
1 be the first country upon which pressure is brought to besr) could m
to add to military security and upset the German plans
cur flank in Iraq which must be held at all costs. To 1..J-S er:cl wr . . mse
the following policy:
(1) Pressure on Iran in co-operation with Russia for expulsion of a
Germans possibly to Turkey;
(2) Strict control over all imports of war material especial m
P
4
end transport into Iren; _
(3) No imp rove, .ent (sic) to co/m.'nica>-. ; > m
iritis
cor