خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الوضع قبيل احتلال الحلفاء، وما بعده" [ظ‎‎٢‎٦‎٠] (٦٠٦/٥٢٠)

4* '/ith these considerations in mind v/e recommend that
the anticipated Persian refusal to extern Germans should be
followed at once by threat, to be implemented with the minimum
of delay, of the stoppage of all supplies from the British .mpire,
Russia, Netherlands Bast Indies and if possible the United States
of America, We do not believe that the general public of Iran
whose sentiments of national loyalty are still ill-developed, would
long sustain the df3prival of items such as sugar,- tea, piece goods
and cheap bazaar articles particularly if they could be made to
understand that the restoration of supplies depended solely on the
expulsion of German technicians and tourists. Concurrently
outspoken press and radio propaganda on this theme would be
required and should be aimed at directing thought op the lines
indicated in para. 3 (2) (b) above (possibly omittiiVg personal
reference to the Shah in the early stages),
^“ l* 0 interpolate here that so far as India is concerned
the process of applying economic pressure would amount only to
refusal of all export licences for (? Iran) withholding of cargo
space for e.g, Japanese merchandise awaiting opward shioment from
Indian ports.
. The result might be an immediate attempt by 3hah at
forcible expropriation oi a• 1*0.0, property. If so we are at once
provided with cover for occupation of oilfields and refinery areas
' - 1 ' para. 30 / (c) above) on the grounds that we are protectini?
our property (? against) German**inspired aggression* Effect of
action would be greatly enhanced if generous releases of "blockade
'commodities’ were immediately rushed to occupied areas.
suggestions made above obviously involve immediate
stoppage of all military and quasi-military (e.g. road transport)
supplies with American co-operation in this respect. Equally they
predicate our opposition to any plan for replacement of Germans by
British or Allied technicians save only in services of wide public
benefit such as irrigation or of potential value to us such as
railways#
6n ( above is merely outline but we must emphasize the
paramount importance of conducting vigorous and carefully devised
propaganda simultaneously with application of sanctions.
.Further question for consideration is whether pressure
should not be applied with further object of securing internment
or surrender of Arab refugees.
Please transmit to Moscow.*
^opy sent to Communications Dept. Foreign Offic-
for this purpose.