خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الوضع قبيل احتلال الحلفاء، وما بعده" [ظ‎‎٣‎٤] (٦٠٦/٦٨)

2 .
(5) Being ignorant of the intentions of His Majesty's
Government I limited myself to expressions of goodwill,
provided n ^ was reciprocated, tallc about economic he In,
.i n , l > 9 0( ^ s ^' ll ^ s s an ^- gave it as my personal opinion
that his^kajes oy s Governiiient had no desire to extend tne
occupation beyond the essential minimum.
(4) The Minister for Foreign Affairs like the public,
seemed io dread the likely occupation of Tehran and to
believe that His Majesty's Government ought to, and could,
this* I told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that
if iehran was occupied the public would, I believe, find
their apprehensions unfounded. I have since learned that
the Soviet Amoassador, though without instructions, expects
that Russian^ troops will arrive shortly. This will have
a good side in that the public, seeing that they are not
complete savages will calm down, but I agree that the
position* of the Government will be very difficult trying to
carry on a policy of co-operation with their capital in
foreign occupatipn^and the German wireless in Persia^"*)
whipping up hostility against them and perhaps against the
.(b) As soori as the. plan of the occupation has been
carried out, the programme will presumably be
*
(a) Rush in supplies, lest we be held responsible for the
shortage. I suggested to the Soviet Ambassador that Russia
might supply wheat and sugar for the North.
(b) Disposal of Germans, taking care that anti-Nazis are not
sent to Germany.
(c) Negotiate agreement with the Persian Government, having
in view the maximum of^co-operation and the minimum of
interference with the internal administration of the country.