مجموعة ١٧ / ١٠ (٤) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٣‎٦] (١٠٣١/٧١)

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<0^ THIS DOCUMEWT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
IRAQ.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 2431/195/93]
^ sulV* April 16, 1945.
2422
4 4 MAY 19«.
945
Section 1.
'HiSsfi
Copy No*
i 1 Q
JL tv O
Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received l§th April.)
(No. 134.)
Sir, Bagdad, %Qth March, 1945.
ON the eve of my departure from Bagdad, it may be of interest if I briefly
review the situation as it stands to-day at the end of the four years during which
I have had the honour to be head of this mission.
2. When I arrived in April 1941 Rashid Ali al Gailani had established a
stranglehold on administration throughout the country. His chief supporters
were a clique of ambitious politicians and army officers who had been brought up
under the old Turkish regime. Rashid Ali was not a popular deader, but by
methods which by now have unfortunately become only too familiar, he established
an armed dictatorship, and the people, cowed into acquiescence, could offer no
resistance. Few Iraqis dared to visit me during that month.
3. The fundamental reasons for this state of affairs were four. First must
be put the gradual weakening of the administration and of the authority of the
Government over a period of eight years which was punctuated by coups d’Etat.
Next was the fact that, with the death of King Faisal in 1933, the country lost its
chief unifying force. His son, King Ghazi, was wild and unbalanced, and when
he met his death in 1938 the Crown passed to a child of 4. The latter’s uncle,
the Amir Abdul Illah, who became Regent, was completely inexperienced, a
stranger to the country, and hampered by shyness and hesitancy. Nor had he any
sensible or capable supporters to help him in establishing his position. He thus
fell an easy prey to an unscrupulous gang. Thirdly, there were the Germans.
Their old plans for eastern expansion were being revived; and they sent here as
their minister a most industrious, experienced and energetic propagandist in
Dr. Grobba. In contrast to the task of his British diplomatic colleagues, who
sought to guide the footsteps of a mercurial people on to constructive paths, his
role was easy : he had to undermine and destroy. In this he was powerfully
assisted by the growing might of Germany and by the dynamism that emanated
from Berlin and Rome. Britain, on the other hand, seemed to be sunk in apathy.
Fourthly, to crown all, came the Arab rebellion in Palestine, and the harsh, but
ineffective, measures which we were taking to suppress it. Day after day the
German and Italian radio would denounce our actions, and day after day we
made no attempt to justify them. Our foreign policy in general was weak and
vacillating and our prestige sank steadily.
4. At the same time the contrast between Iraq and other parts of the Arab
world was striking. In Saudi Arabia a strong man was in control of a kingdom
which he himself had made, a kingdom which had never been the object of German
ambitions. In Egypt and in Palestine we had maintained appreciable military
forces for strategic reasons. In Syria the people were under control of the French
army. In Iraq, however, despite its paramount importance, there were a few
British aircraft but no British troops and no effective organisation to fight enemv
activities. Over a period of seven or eight years we had sat back and watched
our influence decline. It was small wonder that, comparing our apparent weak
ness and ineffectiveness with the dominating position we had held only ten years
before, the people of Iraq considered that, much as some might regret it, our time
was done.
5. It was obvious in April 1941 that Rashid Ali hoped, by feigning loyajty
to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, to keep His Majesty’s Government in play until such
time as the Germans were able to send forces to Iraq. The prompt decision of His
Majesty’s Government to send troops to Basra saved the situation and placed
Rashid Ali in a quandary. If he allowed British troops to come to Bagdad he *
would perish; if he opposed them before the Germans were ready, he could^iot rely
on the help of his secret ally. The arrival at Basra from India of a second brigade
forced his hand and he decided to attack while our forces were still weak. & The
tribes which had waited and watched during April continued inactive during
May, deaf to all his exhortations.
[65—56]
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