"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [و‎‎٧‎٠] (٢٤٨/١٣٩)

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strength at daylight on December 1st. A fierce fight
ensued in which they lost heavily. Taking advantage of
a successful counter-attack made by the Cavalry Brigade,
General Townshend broke off the fight and retired.
Shadi was reached on the night of December 1st after a
march of 30 miles, and on the morning of the 3rd the
6th Division, greatly exhausted, reached Kut-el-Amara.
General Townshend then decided, with Sir John Nixon’s
approval, to defend the place until its relief could be
effected by the reinforcements which were known to be
en route from oversea. Defences were improved, the sick
and wounded were evacuated, and some 1,300 prisoners,
who had been brought away from Ctesiphon, were
despatched to Basra. On December 6th the 6th Cavalry
Brigade left Kut and marched to Ali-el-Gharbi. By
December 7th the Turks had closed round the defences,
and the investment of Kut was complete.
28. Our losses in the battle of Ctesiphon and in subse
quent operations up to the investment of Kut amounted
to 692 killed and 3,852 wounded. The evacuation of
the wounded from these actions was delayed by the
attacks of Arabs on the line of communication below
Kut-el-Amara, which compelled the steamers to turn
back more than once. These attacks also held up Sir
John Nixon and his staff, who were en route from Ctesiphon
to Basra, and, pending the arrival of the troops sent to
their assistance, the escort, soldier clerks, batmen and
orderlies on the headquarters steamer, commanded by
Major-General Kemball, had to be landed in order to
repel these marauders.
PHASE IV.
29. The 6th Cavalry Brigade at Ali-el-Gharbi was at
once reinforced by the 28th Infantry Brigade and some
guns from Basra. Behind this covering detachment it
was decided to organise for the relief of Kut a force
composed of two divisions from overseas, designated the
Tigris Corps, the command of which was entrusted to
Lieut.-General Sir Fenton Aylmer. The Corps con
sisted of the 6th Cavalry Brigade, the 3rd Division under
Major-General H. D’U. Keary, and the 7th Division
under Major-General Sir George Younghusband, with
corps and divisional troops.
30. General Aylmer informed Sir John Nixon on
December 15th, 1915, that in his judgment it would
be hazardous to rely on General Townshend’s holding
out beyond January 15th, and that it was therefore
advisable to relieve Kut by January 10th. He accordingly
recommended that the troops then concentrating at
Ali-el-Gharbi should move about January 3rd. Sir John
Nixon concurred, and on December 27th gave definite
orders for the advance to commence on that date.
31. On January 4th, 1916, General Aylmer’s leading
troops under General Younghusband advanced towards
Sheikh Saad, moving by both banks of the Tigris. The
instructions given him were to hold the enemy to his
position with sufficient vigour to make him show his
hand, pending the arrival of the remainder of the Corps
under General Aylmer himself. General Younghusband’s
column got in touch with the enemy on the morning of
January 6th. The Turks were entrenched astride the
Tigris some 4 or 5 miles east of Sheikh Saad. General
Younghusband’s plan was to hold the enemy’s left and
to attack and turn his right. This plan did not succeed,
owing to the presence of hostile cavalry and the superior
forces of the enemy on this flank.
32. Battle of Sheikh Saad. —General Aylmer arrived on
the morning of January 7 th with the rest of the Corps
and ordered a general attack. Major-General Young
husband directed operations on the left bank and Major
General Kemball on the right. Heavy fighting took
place throughout the day, and by evening the enemy’s
trenches on the right bank had been captured together
with 2 guns and some 600 prisoners. On the left bank,
where our main attack was intended to develop, our
troops were unable to make any progress. They had to
entrench opposite to the Turks, who held tenaciously
to their positions. All attempts to turn their left flank
failed, owing to counter attacks and enveloping move
ments from the north. On the following day the troops
were very fatigued and little progress was made. On
January 9th the Turks abandoned their position and
retired upstream. The pursuit proved very arduous
owing to heavy rain throughout the day, which made
the sodden and boggy ground difficult to march over.
The losses of the enemy were estimated to be about
4,500, and our own casualties amounted to 4,262. Our
losses in British officers were especially heavy, amounting
to no less than 133. The exhaustion of the troops made
it difficult to follow up the enemy, so for the next few
days the force halted, while the Turks withdrew to the
Wadi position, some 7 or 8 miles further up river from
Sheikh Saad.
33. Battle of the Wadi.—On the 12th General Aylmer
concentrated his whole force on the left bank, and on
the 13th attacked the Wadi position. His plan was to
turn this position by a wide outflanking movement to
the north. This was to be carried out by General Young
husband with the 6th Cavalry Brigade and the 19th,
21st and 35th Infantry Brigades, supported by field
artillery, while Major-General Kemball with the 28th
Infantry Brigade, supported by the heavy artillery of
the Corps, was to hold the enemy to his front. The
9th Brigade was to remain in reserve at Sheikh Saad.
General Younghusband’s force moved into position by
a night march on the 12th-13th, and then advanced in
a south-westerly direction towards Umm-el-Hannah,
between the Suwaikieh marsh and the Tigris,with a view
to cutting off the enemy’s retreat. This movement
was, however, checked by hostile troops occupj ing
trenches facing north, and as our troops endeavoured
to outflank the enemy they were in turn outflanked
themselves. Before long, therefore, General Yovrg-
husband was held up on an east and west line to the rear
of the enemy’s main positions. Meanwhile General
Kemball attacked on the Wadi itself. His troops came
under a most destructive rifle and machine gun fire at
close range, which soon brought his advance to a stand
still. During the night of the 13th-14th the enemy
evacuated the Wadi position and retired into the l min»
el-Hannah defile, some 3 miles further west, where a
strong defensive position, stretching along a front of
1,300 yards from the Tigris to the Suwaikieh marsh,
had been in preparation for some time.
34. On January 14th the 6th Cavalry Brigade and
the 7th Division, under General Younghusband, worked
forward to a position from which they could observe
the enemy’s defences. The exhaustion of a considerable
portion of the force and the necessity for evacuating the
wounded precluded the idea of any immediate advance.
So the day was spent in consolidating positions and in
bringing the wounded down to the ri\ er bank. The
latter operation was greatly impeded by heavy ram
which made the ground slippery and difficult to traverse.
The losses of the enemy in this action were not as heavy
as our own, as they were well sheltered in trenches
throughout the day, and retired in good order after
dark. Our own casualties amounted to 1,601, including
40 British officers.
35. On January 19th Sir John Nixon had to relinquish
command of the Force owing to ill-health, and was
replaced by Sir Percy Lake.
36. Unsuccessful attack on the Umm-el-Hannah position.
The weather now became extraordinarily bad. Hea,vy
rain caused the river to come down in flood, overflowing
its banks in places and converting the ground on either
bank into a veritable bog. The Wadi stream came down
in spate, and boisterous winds greatly interfered with
the construction of a bridge across the Tigris. In spjte
of these unfavourable conditions, the 19th and 35th
Infantry Brigades advanced towards the Umm-el-Hannah
defile and entrenched themselves facing the enemy. At
the same time troops were ferried over gradually to Grab
on the right bank, where they came under the orders
of Major-General Keary, commanding the 3rd Division,
part of which had arrived at the front. 1 he object of
this move was to establish our artillery in positions from
which they could enfilade the enemy’s trenches, as without
such artillery co-operation the capture of the enemy’s
position presented extraordinary difficulties. By the
morning of the 20th we had 14 guns in their emplace
ments ready to bombard the Turkish trenches. On the
16th 17th and 18th weather conditions grew from bad
to worse, and the men suffered great hardships from
cold and exposure. On the nights of the 18fch-19th
and 20th-2lst the 7th Division again moved forward
and entrenched within 500 to 600 yu,ds of the enemy s