"لجنة بلاد الرافدين. تقرير اللجنة المُعينة بموجب قانون البرلمان للتحقيق في عمليات الحرب في بلاد الرافدين، بالإضافة إلى تقرير خاص أعده القائد ج. ويدجوود، الحاصل على وسام الخدمة المتميزة، وعضو البرلمان، وملاحق. لندن: مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية، ١٩١٧." [ظ‎‎٧‎٠] (٢٤٨/١٤٠)

138
line, while 30 guns were placed in positions suitable
ior a bombardment by direct fire. The 20th was devoted
^jcematic shelling of the Turkish position from
uvu nanks of the Tigris, and during the night of the
.* ^._st the infantry of the 7th Division pushed forward
heir advanced lines preparatory to the assault. By
6 a.m. all was ready for the attack, which was to be
directed against the enemy’s right, under cover of an
intensive artillery bombardment. The main attack
rushed the Turkish trenches near the river, and about
100 men got into them and held them for over an hour.
Troops were moved forward to their support under
heavy fire, but they drifted too far to the right, with the
result that they failed to give the impetus required on
the left, where their assistance was urgently needed.
Profiting by this, the Turks made a vigorous local counter
attack, and our troops, overwhelmed by superior numbers,
were forced back and compelled to vacate the trenches
which they had captured. Orders were at once issued
for a second assault. Meanwhile it had begun to rain,
and it continued to do so without intermission until
the next day. After another artillery bombardment the
attack was renewed at 2 p.m. ; but the heavy rain had
made the ground difficult to move over, advances by
rushes were impossible, the ground to be traversed was
destitute of cover, and the enemy’s fire was heavy and
well directed. Thus, though every effort was made to
press forward, not an inch of ground could be gained.
37. The weather conditions rapidly became worse, the
ground being converted into a sea of mud over which
progress was almost impossible. The troops could do no
more than maintain themselves w'here they were until
dark, when they were withdrawn to the trenches they
had previously held. As far as possible all the wounded
lying between our forward position and that in rear
were brought in during the ■withdrawal. Some, however,
were overlooked, and others could not be got at owing
to their proximity to the enemy’s trenches. Arrange
ments were accordingly made on the 22nd for a six
hours’ armistice in order to bring in the dead and remove
any wounded who might have been left out. It was
found that few but dead remained, as all the w'ounded who
had fallen close to the enemy’s trenches had been
removed by the Turks. Any idea of an immediate
offensive w r as prohibited by the need for giving the
troops a rest after the heavy losses they had suffered.
The enemy’s casualties were estimated at 2,000. Our
own amounted to 2,741, including 78 British officers.
38. The breakdown in the medical arrangements which
undoubtedly occurred after these three battles would
have been obviated to a great extent if the attempt to
relieve Kut-el-Amara had been postponed until the
arrival of the field ambulances and clearing hospitals
of the 3rd and 7th Divisions from France. As it happened,
the supposed necessity of relieving General Townshend’s
garrison by January 15th demanded an advance not
later than January 4th, and the field ambulances of the
Tigris Corps had accordingly to be improvised from any
sources available at the time. As explained further on
in this report, the arrangements made proved totally
inadequate and led to the serious breakdown referred to.
39. When General Townshend decided, with Sir John
Nixon’s approval, to defend Kut-el-Amara, he did so
on the understanding that he would be relieved within
a month or six weeks, as he had only supplies with him
for that period. Kut was completely invested on
December 7th, so January 15th represented approxi
mately the date up to which his supplies would last
if issues were continued on the normal scale. Sir John
Nixon and General Aylmer were thus, in our opinion,
fully justified in assuming that it would be hazardous
to rely on General Townshend’s holding out beyond
that date. Apart, however, from the question of supplies.
Genera] Townshend sent message after message urging
the necessity for his early relief. Shortage of rifle
ammunition, deficiencies in artillery ammunition, heavy
losses, the reinforcement of the enemy, the falling-off
in moral of some of his troops, and doubts as to the
ability of the garrison to withstand a determined assault
by superior numbers, were all urged by him as reason
for the advance of the relief force at the earliest possible
date.
40. On January 22nd General Townshend informed
General Aylmer that by putting his troops on half rations
he could last out for 27 days, t.e., up to February 18th.
Three days later he intimated that by utilising additional
supplies found in Kut, and by killing his horses and
mules, he could hold out for another 84 days. He was
then asked on February 3rd by Sir Percy Lake whether
it would be correct to assume that he had sufficient
supplies to feed his garrison up to April 17th. He replied
on February 5th that by killing his animals and living
on grain and florse flesh he could hold out up to that
date. In point of fact he exceeded this limit by 12 days.
The period between January 21st and the first week
of March was one of preparation. The concentration of
the 3rd Division was completed, and the medical units
of this and the 7th Division also reached the front, though
without their transport. On March 7th orders were
issued for an advance from the position held by the
3rd Division on the right bank of the Tigris near Orah
to that portion of the enemy’s line which lay between
the Sinn Aftar and Dujailah redoubts. The troops
detailed for this operation were grouped in three columns.
The 9th, 28th and 36th Infantry Brigades under Major-
General Kemball made up Columns “ A ” and “ B,”
while Column “ C ” consisted of the 3rd Division under
Major-General Keary.
41. Attack on Es Sinn. —General Aylmer’s plan was to
capture the Es Sinn position by turning its right flank
and seizing the Dujailah redoubt. Column “ C,” mainly
composed of the 3rd Division, was directed against the
Sinn Aftar redoubt and the works to the south of it,
while Column “ B,” composed of the 9th and 28th Infantry
Brigades, was detailed to assault the Dujailah redoubt.
Column “ A,” consisting of the 36th Infantry Brigade,
was directed to clear some trenches which flanked the
advance of Column “ B.” The 35th Infantry Brigade
was to protect the right, and the 6th Cavalry Brigade
the left flank of the force, and a brigade was held in
reserve. Each column was allotted its proper proportion
of guns, engineers, field ambulances and transport. The
advance was made on the night of March 7th-8th. After
a long and well-executed night march, the troops reached
the positions of deployment. All the columns should
have got there before dawn, but the march of Columns
“ A ” and “ B ” was delayed owing to various unforeseen
circumstances, with the result that it was broad daylight
before they were ready to deploy, and this manoeuvre
had then to be executed under fire. An assault was
made and a lodgment effected in the Dujailah redoubt,
but our troops were eventually bombed out and had to
retire. Orders were then given for a fresh assault, and
at 5.15 p.m. the troops advanced according to orders,
but could get no nearer to the redoubt than about 1,200
yards. The men by this time were exhausted, and about
6 p.m. orders were received to withdraw under cover
of darkness. The night of the 8th-9th was spent in
collecting and sending away the wounded, and by 9.30
a.m. on the 9th the evacuation was completed. The
force then marched back to Orah and Wadi whence it
had started. Our losses in these operations amounted
to about 470 killed and 2,877 wounded and missing.
The total casualties from January 6th to March 9th
amounted to 12,116, of whom 2,412 were either killed
or died of wounds. The casualties among British officers
were 410.
42. Attack on the Umm-el-Hannah and Falahiyah
positions. —On March 11th General Aylmer was replaced
in command by Sir George Gorringe, and during the
month the force was reinforced by the 13th Division
under Major-General F. S. Maude, besides other troops.
On April 5th General Gorringe commenced his operations
for the relief of Knt. After the attack on Umm-el-
Hannah on January 21st, which was made across the
open, our trenches were pushed forward gradually to
within 100 yards of the Turkish defences. After a
heavy bombardment, to break down the enemy’s
entanglements, the assault was delivered at 4.45 a.m.
on the 5th, and the first line captured by our troops
soon after dawn. The other lines were captured in quick
succession, the artillery fire being lifted from trench to
trench until the last line was reached, fully a mile in
rear. Our losses were slight and the enemy’s resistance
was not great, as most of his troops had been withdrawn
to the Falahiyah position. The latter consisted of a
ystem of entrenchments 2 miles deep, which were