"سكة حديد كويته-سيستان" [ظ‎‎١‎٢] (١٢/١٠)

solely on this ground. We did not begin a Tigris railway last Novem her
because the military authorities thought that the military operations would
be 1 ini shed before the railway ; and it would be imprudent to rely on
similar expectations in Persia.
In any case it would seem advisable to get on to Dalbandin as quickly
as possible, and be guided by events on getting there.
It may, perhaps, be added that this Department advised the construction
of this line some months ago, but had in mind a light railway only.
27th July 1016.
MINUTE BY GENERAL SIR EDMUND BARROW, G.C.B.
I am concerned only with the military aspects of this case, but even those
embrace such wide considerations that I cannot fully deal with them within
the limited scope of an office “minute.” Happily the ABC of the subject
is tersely expressed in the passages from Lord Curzon’s minutes quoted
above. Quite briefly those elementary considerations emphasize the cardinal
point that Seistan will some day inevitably be necessary to us, not for an
offensive campaign against Russia, but for the indirect defence of India.
It is, in fact, a bastion covering a sally port against either a Russian march
from Herat to Kandahar or a Russian advance to Southern Persia and
the sea.
When the subject was taken up in 1911 in connection with the scheme
of linking up the European and Indian Railways, the Government of
India practically endorsed the views of the military authorities in India that
any connection should be from Bunder Abbas along the sea coast to Karachi,
and not via Seistan and Nushki. I will not waste time b}' going into
the presentation of the case made by the then Chief of the General Staff
(Sir Douglas Haig), but I will merely observe that the General Staff case
rests on the supposition that the guns of the fleet will always be available
to protect our railway along the Mekran Coast, a supposition which will
not bear examination as some new combination, such as a Russo-Japanese
alliance against us, might deprive us of local Naval superiority. Moreover,
I cannot conceive a more inhospitable alignment for a railway than the
Mekran Coast in summer, whether it be for war or commerce. We have
seen lately what the Indus Valley line is like in summer. The Mekran
line would be no better. On the other hand, the Seistan-Nushki alignment
is along the high ground of the Pcrso-Baluch plateau, which, at any rate, is
climatically preferable. I hat line has, however, been condemned by some
of oui militaiv advisers on the ground that it is readily exposed to attack,
and might be seized and utilized by our enemy. In reply, I would only say
that the gicat Napoleon laid it down as an axiom that the greatest military
obstacle in nature was a desert, and I would point out that the northern
flank ol this line is protected by the Dasht-i-Lut, the swamps of Seistan, the
i asht-i-Muigo, and the Registan, so that Napoleon would have considered
it an ideal line for safety from serious attack. I am not talking of the
attacks of a few marauders with a sack full of combustibles.
Assuming then that there are no tenable military objections to a railway
line from Kushlu to Seistan we come to the immediate question at issue.
1 he distance to Robat is 360 miles; therefore at the very least the entire
bno would take 1, years to build, that is to say it would not be ready for
use till the hot weather of 1918, and therefore it is not likely, I trust, to be of
muc i use o us c uimg the present war. lor this reason 1 am inclined to agree
wn i the compromise proposed by the Commander-in-Chief, viz., to continue
e , wa > 0 ft -mik in and trust to motor and camel transport for the
i ^ K ( hstancc is 120 miles onlv and therefore we might
C ,° Vtr tl "j\ dlst;mce m six or seven months,'that is to say by the end
with the waL* C ° C season ’ w ^ en ^ ma y sbH be useful to us in connection
whethlrTe^l diV t0 aU ''L b ^ leuw 'ii l 16 u matter for consideration
1 ‘ oul ' 1 carr y 11 furth( H' for commercial purposes. It is possible