"الملف 14/115 VII الملحق (B 9) أكسيد جزيرة أبو موسى: مواد خلفية حول هذه القضية" [ظ‎‎٦‎١] (١٩٠٤/١٣٣)

council, but I think that would be imm aterial. Major Cox presides in the senior couit
on the coasts of the Persian Gulf, but he has already been concerned in the case in
other capacities, and the Germans would be entitled to object to the matter being
settled by him. . . .
10. The^ offer of such a settlement, proceeding as it does on commercial lines, will
probably not be very welcome to Germany, whose object is, no doubt, to drag the
political aspects to the front. At the same time it would not be easy for her to find
adequate grounds for refusing it, and if she did refuse it she would, 1 thims;, be in a
less favourable position for fighting the case afterwards, as it would render it easier
for His Majesty's Government to take the line that the right of the sheikh to cancel a
concession held by British subjects was certainly not a matter which Great Britain
could consent to arbitrate with Germany at The Hague, and that the injury caused to
Wonckhaus by the failure of a British subject to carry out his contract was a matter
which could be adequately dealt with before the judicial tribunals, a course tor which
His Majesty's Government would provide every facility.
11. The advantage of compromising the dispute, if it can be done, on the imes
suggested above, instead of relying solely on the grounds set out in the preceding
paragraph, is that His Majesty's Government will in any case have to pay the compensa
tion, and that it will considerably reduce the amount if it only represents damages for
three years' interruption, instead of damages for total and permanent breach oi the
contract. Furthermore, it is desirable for the sake of the sheikh that mining opera
tions should be resumed as soon as possible, and unless arrangements are going to be
made to enable the Wonckhaus contract to be carried out, the mining must be put into
the hands of some British firm, and it would look as if our object had been to crush
German trade rather than to prevent Germany acquiring political interests.
As Major Cox is in London, I think it would be a good thing to ascertain whether
he thinks a compromise on these lines would be desirable, and, f so, whether it is
feasible,
C. J. B. H.
Foreign Office, February 4, 1910.
With reference to the last paragraph of the foregoing minute. Major Cox is now
studying the German note and has talked it over with Mr, Hurst. It might assist him
if this minute were sent to him privately at once.
H. N.
Foreign Office, February 6, 1910.
E. P. M.
L. M.
My notes accompany.
P. c,
February 12, 1910.
Enclosure 1 in No. 1.
Notes hy Major Cox respecting
I STUDIED the German rejoinder on receipt, and after reducing my ideas to
writing provisionally, I discussed it informally with Mr. Hurst, and have now received
his minute for comment.
I should wish to mention in the first instance that when I was in Tehran in
November, Count Quadt, the German Minister, went out of his way to be gracious and
hospitable to me, and in the course of one of several informal conversations which we
had, he referred incidentally to the Abu Musa case.
I took the opportunity of assuring him then that there had never been any desire
on the part of the Sheikh of Shargah or the British residency at Bushire (as my present
German colleague at Bushire seemed persuaded was the case) to prevent Wonckhaus
altogether from trading in Abu Musa oxide, and I expressed my regret personally, as
a local official, that the dispute had assumed such protracte'd proportions. He in turn
asked me to accept his emphatic personal assurances that in taking up Wonckhaus's
ease his Government had had no political motive whatever, but simply desired to