الملف E/8 I ابن سعود [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٠] (٦٠٦/٢٥٥)

with our officers at Bahrain. He remarked that he had no further motion
regarding the conditions which the Turks would demand of him, but that they
would never allow the presence of foreigners at Katif and that, in the event of an
agreement being arrived at between him and themselves, they would undoubtedly
compel him to keep such persons out.
6. I here thought it best to tell the Amir plainly that I had no authority to go
over the old ground again, neither had I come out to persuade him to take a course
contrary to his inclinations, but that my duty was merely to carry oat the instruc-
tions which I had received. He then asked me whether, should iie persevere witr t e
answer already given to Saiyid Talib {vide the enclosure to my letter iNo. 0.-12,
dated 7th April), there would be any chance eventually of securmg the mediation of
His Majesty's Government. I replied that probably in that case the Tuiks woulu
ask for that mediation which they had now declined in the hope of securing an agree
ment without it; but Bin Sa'ud appeared to think that they would prefer war to that
and went on to question me regarding the preparedness or unpreparedness of j ur^ey
for war from which I saw that he was carefully considering this alternative. ^ Before
our interview closed he asked me whether His Majesty s Government would give him
an assurance that the Turks would never be allowed to take hostile action by sea
against the coast between Kuwait and Bahrain, as, he said, with that assurance
he was prepared to defy them indefinitely, but I replied that I had no information on
the subject beyond that already given to him in regard to Bahrain and its waters.
7. I Confess that I returned to Kuwait without a clear idea of what course Bin
Sa'ud was likely to take, in fact I doubt whether he has himseli come as yet to a
definite decision. That he would prefer to persevere in his refusal to accept any
arrangement which was not guaranteed in some form or another by His Majesty s
Government I am convinced, and that Shaikh Sir Mubarak and other friends have
inspired him with that confidence in us which he lacks in the Turks is certain; but he
seems to fear that in default of a definite promise such as that referred to above he
might be left to face attacks by sea as well as by land which would be more than he
could repel; and he may on this account feel obliged to make the best terms possible
for himself at the approaching conference. In the latter case I regard it as in the
highest degree probable that he will use every possible means to draw His Majesty's
Government into the negotiations, e.g., by accepting, under the plea of compulsion,
conditions from the Turks which he knows we will be loth to recognise owing to the
interests assailed.
8. I hope to be able to report further within the next few days, and in view of
the interesting position which now exists here am sending a copy of this letter direct
to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to save time.