الملف E/8 I ابن سعود [ظ‎‎٨‎١] (٦٠٦/١٧٥)

8
in fact it has already existed for years. Accordingly he proposed to reply to the
Turkish overtures that the questions between him and the Turkish Government ap
peared to him to be matters which could be better discussed at a personal interview
that he would be moving to the northern end of his territory in the spring after
two or three months, and that he suggested that the Wali should meet him then some^
wherein the neighbourhood of Basra. He would add (and would also inforrri
his agents in Basra and Baghdad) that his recent meeting with British officers at
Ojair had its raison d'etre in the necessity for making some arrangement to faci
litate communication between his officials on the coast and the neighbouring Bri
tish officials in regard to the settlement of commercial and pearling claims and
cases arising between British subjects (and proteges) and the local people ; the
apprehension of fugitive offenders; and the co-operation of his local officials in
cases of piracy. i
13. As Bin Saud was frank enough to tell us the lines of his proposed reply, we
ventured to say that its terms seemed to us unobjectionable and asked him whether
he had any objection to our communicating its general tenour in our report ; to
this he replied that he had no objection, but that he hoped that the British Govern
ment would see therein an earnest of his sincere desire to arrive at a
with them, and would exercise their benevolent good offices on his behalf.
A. P. TEEVOR,
W. H. I SHAKESPEAR,
Note. —In order to prevent any misapprehension the note of our interviews from which this
memorandum has been compiled were translated to Bin Saud, and he agreed that they were an
accurate resume of our discussions.
CONFIDENTIAL.
II.— Memorandum of questions raised hy Bi Trucial
After the discussion on the subject of arranging a with Bin Saud
had been finished, he said that he had another matter to discuss with us. He then
asked us what was the policy of the British Government in regard to Katar and the
Trucial Oman states. We said that we could not make any definite pronouncement
on the subject, but that as a general rule, as far as we were aware, the policy of the
Government was one of non-interference in internal matters; in the case of the Tru
cial Chiefs we had certain agreements of long-standing regarding the Maritime Truce,
the Slake Trade and Arms Traffic to which we held the Shaikhs, but we did not as a
rule interfere with their rule on shore. As regards Katar we translated to him
the clause referring to that region in the recent Anglo-Turkish Convention, and said
that we presumed the British policy there would also be one of non-interference.
Bin Saud said that there was a possibility that enemies of his might take re
fuge in some of these states and plot against him and foment trouble—he instanced
the case of his relatives, the Araif, who are now in Katar—and asked what the
c./., Bahrain and Kuwait Diaries, 1912-13. attitude of the Government would be in re
gard to such cases. We said that we were
unable to state definitely but would be glad to refer the matter to higher authority
with a view to getting the point settled as soon as possible. He was apparently
satisfied with this, but urged that the matter was important to him as affecting his
authority over the adjacent Bedouin tribes. At any time in order to check the
intrigues of such people it might be necessary for him to take reprisals and this
might involve him with the British Government, which he was anxious to avoid.
18th December 1913. A. P. TREVOR, Major,
at sea.
W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR,
G. M. Press, Simla.—No. C. 614 F. D.—21-1-14.—12.—C.W.M
18th December
AT SEA.