"مذكرة قصيرة حول بدء حملة بلاد الرافدين والصعوبات التي واجهتها ونتائجها" [و‎‎٣] (١٠/٥)

3
This conveys some idea of the extent to which the military system of India,
limited in peace to preparations for the defence of India and action against Afghan
istan, met the calls made on it in the Imperial cause.
7. Dealing more particularly with the campaign in Mesopotamia, the diffi
culties which the campaign has presented to India come under heads:—
Political
Strategical
Physical
Climatic
Local feeling
Religious complications,
which are discussed below.
8. Political difficulties. —India's interest in the Persian Gulf has been,
previous to the war, mainly confined to the ports and the routes tapping inland
trade.
British interests could be adequately safeguarded by commercial pressure and,
though plans for the application of military force on the littoral were ready, there
was little likelihood of their having to be put into execution.
In 1913-14, however, the acquisition by the Home Government of the oilfields
placed a vulnerable objective within reach of hostile pressure. The value to a sea
Empire of this objective, and its vulnerability, demanded a consideration of means
of defence ; while, as from its nature, political or commercial pressure could not
be relied on to secure it, its defence devolved on the action of land forces.
The land forces required for this depended on the danger, and on the only
occasion when the military authorities in India were consulted on the question, in
January 1914, they gave it as their opinion that, in the event of local disturbances,
from two brigades to a division would be necessary for the protection of the oilfields
in the Karun area, but that in the event of major complications it was impossible
to estimate its requirements.
9. The provision of the lesser force had already been foreseen in Plans of
Operation for securing British interests in Persia and the Gulf—the method of
coping with major complications depended on questions of Imperial strategy of
which the Government of India was not sufficiently informed to forecast require
ments.
10. The views of those responsible for this forecast do not appear to have
been clearly focussed at the commencement of the Mesopotamian campaign.
The policy laid down by His Majesty's Government for the campaign as
known to the Government of India at different stages was as follows : —
On 5th October 1914, to occupy Abadan and protect the oil tanks and pipe
line.
An advanced force from the 6th Division was prepared for this and despatch
ed to the Persian Gulf on 16th October 1914.
On 1 st November 1914, the Secretary of State directed that the force was to
attack Fao and clear the Turks out of the Shatt-al-Arab as far as Shamshumiya.
A second Brigade of the 6th Division, which had been prepared, had reinforced
the advanced portion by end of November, and attained its object—the secur
ing of Basrah.
(These orders, and the preparations made on them, did not provide for an
advance up either the Tigris or Euphrates.)
Defensive operations followed (in which the remainder of the 6th Division
joined and by the end of April the 12th Division, from India less one brigade from
Egypt), which ended in an advance up the Tigris and Euphrates to Amarah and
Nasiriyah with a view to ensuring the security of the Basrah Vilayet*