"مذكرة قصيرة حول بدء حملة بلاد الرافدين والصعوبات التي واجهتها ونتائجها" [ظ‎‎٣] (١٠/٦)

4
These operations culm nated in the advance through Kut to Aziziyah. On
24th October, aiter much correspondence, the advance on Baghdad was ordered.
During this time the Government of India was not made aware of any gen
eral policy governing the campaign from its inception—the indications pointing
rather to an indefinite policy: a defensive in the first instance, then a cautious
advance and finally a bold offensive followed each other with little notice of the
change.
Since October 24th the policy has remained sufficiently definite, , the
maintenance of as forward a position as possible, but the military execution of this
policy has demanded several additions to the force already employed—entailing
improvements in transport arrangements, which from their nature cannot be carried
through with the rapidity of a change in a previously indefinite policy.
11. Strategical difficulties. —Previous to the war, responsibility for acquiring
intelligence regarding Mesopotamia, with the exception of the portion south of a
line Basrah-Akaba, had been taken over by the War Office, on whom the military
authorities in India were in consequence dependent for the collated information
on which to frame^Plans of Operations. The information supplied proved to be
inadequate and, in the absence of a definite policy and plan in respect of operations
in this theatre, the preparations to carry it out, which would have made this defici
ency evident, were not made in India; while no such plan was received from the
War Office. Insufficiency of information, especially with regard to the rivers, has
hampered both Commanders in the field and the Government of India in making
timely forecasts of requirements.
12. The changes in policy have been referred to.
The procedure with regard to the management of the campaign was laid down
by the Secretary of State as control of the scope of operations by himself and
management by India.
13. Physical. —The physical difficulties of the theatre of operations are
considerable and of a nature not contemplated in the preparations made by India
for the primary role of her army, 1, e., operations on the North-West Frontier of
India.
Although the base, Basrah, can be classed as a seaport, the Fao bar, restrict
ing passage of vessels drawing over 18 feet, limits the number of transports
which can be conveniently used, and, when the numbers required exceeded that
limit, has entailed lengthy transhipping arrangements which have added consider
ably to the difficulty of maintenance from overseas.
Basrah Port was equipped to deal with a small mercantile shipping. The ship
ping to be dealt with during the campaign increased simultaneously with the increase
of the force, which followed so swiftly on the changes of policy that it was impos
sible to provide the additional port facilities necessary to cope with the increased
shipping. Congestion in the port, on the wharves, and in the depots followed
inevitably and has been and is one of the great difficulties with which the adminis
trative branches in Mesopotamia have had to deal.
The navigation of the Karun, Tigris and Euphrates present markedly
different problems, while the characterist'cs of the Tigris and Euphrates were little
known previous to our advance up them.
River craft on these rivers was only sufficient for the requirements of a
limited peace traffic with the repairing and docking facilities in proportion.
There was therefore no establishment for the building and upkeep of a
river fleet suitable or sufficient for the requirements of operations. The output of
similar establishments in India was limited, and dependent in large measure on
import from overseas, and all ready-made imported craft have proved to have
grave defects of some kind or other.
Construction in England has been slow, uncertain and subordinate to the
Admiralty requirements, while the assembly of vessels sent out to be put together
in Mesopotamia has been delayed by breakdowns in the workshops there.