Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt [‎26v] (52/176)

2
Alexandria Area—
Infantry brigade headquarters.
1 infantry battalion (less 2 platoons ar.
Cyprus).
1 infantry battalion (less 1 company at
Mex, 4 miles south-west of Alexandria).
R.A.F. aircraft depot.
R.A.F. stores depot.
1 infantry battalion (less 1 platoon at Port
Said).
1 brigade, R.F.A. (3 batteries).
1 field company, R.E.
6. It will be noted that the bulk of the garrison is in the Cairo area. Existing
accommodation and administrative questions have contributed towards this, but the
necessity of being in a position to control Cairo is the main reason. With two battalions
in Cairo City, the cantonments of Helmieh and Abbassia are well placed to achieve this
object and to enable dispositions to be made for the protection of the railways and the
head of the Fresh Water Canal, and for the defence of the aerodromes and wireless
station.
7. However, as regards Cairo City, it appears inevitable that the Kasr-el-Nil barracks
will have to be given up sooner or later. L'heir position is an important one, being close
to the Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. and the main European quarter and commanding the principal bridge
over the Nile. We shall have to accept the loss of these advantages, which no other
locality can give us, and we must note that the barracks in the hands of the Egyptian
Army will be difficult to re-occupy. The battalion so displaced will have to be
accommodated at some adjacent cantonment, the choice depending upon tactical and
administrative factors which the General Officer Commanding, Egypt, can best
appreciate.
8. The evacuation of the Citadel at Cairo is even more serious than that of the
Kasr-el-Nil Barracks, owing to its strength and commanding position. In hostile hands
its capture would always be a serious undertaking. Also, it contains the main military
hospital in Egypt for which other accommodation would have to be provided. If it is
found absolutely essential to vacate the Citadel, the battalion and hospital would have to
be accommodated in one of the adjacent cantonments, the advice of the General Officer
Commanding, Egypt, being asked as regards the exact location.
9. In addition to the above, Command Headquarters would have to be transferred
from Cairo to Abbassia.
10. As regards Alexandria, in addition to the control of the port and town, the Royal
Air Force camp at Aboukir has to be protected. For these tasks the present garrison
should be retained. It is only suggested that the Ordnance Depot at Mex should be
transferred to Abbassia.
11. As regards the location of the remainder of the Egyptian garrison, no change
appears necessary, and it is proposed that the troops now at Moascar and Ismailia should
be left there. They are well placed for the immediate defence of the Canal, and for
safeguarding the Fort Said—Suez Railway.
12. Thus, if re-distribution is forced upon us, the suggestions mentioned above can
be summarized as follows :—
Cairo—
Command Headquarters, from Cairo to Abbassia.
I battalion from Kasr-el-Nil to Abbassia or Helmieh, or new cantonment.
1 battalion from Citadel to Abbassia or Helmieh, or new cantonment.
General Hospital from Citadel to Abbassia.
Ordnance Details from Cairo to Abbassia.
Alexandria—
Ordnance Depot from Alexandria to Abbassia.
13. It will be seen that the above proposals contemplate no immediate reduction in
the strength of the garrison in Egypt. The fighting forces (including 1,500 Royal Air
Force) now total in round numbers about 11,500, which is an increase on the pre-war
(a) Mustapha (5 miles east of
Alexandria).
(b) Sidi Bishir (10 miles north
east of Alexandria).
(c) Aboukir (13 miles north-east
of Alexandria).
(3) Moascar Area—
(a) Moascar
(b) Ismailia