Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt [‎10r] (19/176)

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Irom United Kingdom to Australia.
Metal manufactures.
# Textiles.
Miscellaneous manufactures.
86. China and Japan have not been considered above, as the imports into the
United Kingdom from these sources are not vital.
87. From the above analysis it will be seen that economically it is essential for
the United Kingdom to obtain supplies from the sources in question.
* 88. In the event of the Suez Canal being blocked for any extended period, the
alternative route via the Cape would have to be used. Roughly speaking, in a
voyage from the United Kingdom to Bombay, this means a distance of 10,450 miles
against 6,050 miles via Suez. In the case of Singapore, the distance from the United
Kingdom would be 11,569 miles against 8,066 miles via Suez.
89. This increased length of route would, in any case, disorganise normal traffic,
so far as the protection of shipping was concerned, and might also have one of the
two following effects :—
(a.) The increased freight causing higher prices might have the effect of
reducing trade, with consequent distress in British exporting manufac
turing industries,
or
(b.) If the volume of trade remained steady, or increases, a larger amount of
tonnage would be required, and this, at a time when tonnage is likely to
be in great demand (i.e., in war-time).
90. It is thought likely that the second alternative is the more probable, as the
United Kingdom demand for supplies from the East would tend to increase on the
outbreak of war, and, in consequence, more tonnage space would be required,
' irrespective of whether exports from the United Kingdom declined or not.
In either event the increased freights would be bound to react upon prices.
91. As regards Persian oil supplies, about 40 per cent, of the output can, at
present, be refined at Abadan (1,000,000 tons per annum). This refinery will be
capable of dealing with increasing amounts of crude oil as time progresses, but in
1921, 300,000 tons of the crude petroleum were shipped from Persia to the United
Kingdom, and the South Wales Refinery is drawing an increasing supply from this
source. On the other hand, a refinery for Persian oil is also being established in
Australia, and in the event of war in the East, not only would the Persian output
be deflected East for Fleet consumption, but a supplementary supply for this purpose
would in all probability transit the Canal in an easterly direction from the United
Kingdom stocks. The tanker tonnage would be fully employed in this emergency,
and would probably be insufficient to cope with the increased length of voyage via the
Cape in the event of the Suez Canal being blocked.
XIII.—Great Britain’s Obligation to Preserve the Neutrality of the Canal and to
Intervene to Prevent Violation of its Neutrality.
92. In Appendix II to this paper will be found some observations by the Foreign
Office (Appendix III to C.I.D. 115-B of June 2, 1910), written in 1910, regarding
the obligations of Powers* signatory to the Suez Canal Convention of the 29th
October, 1888, and of Great Britain m particular, to preserve the neutrality of the
Suez Canal.
93. Although these remarks were made at a time when the Committee of
* Imperial Defence were investigating the problem of the defence of the Suez Canal
against Turkish aggression from the East, it would appear that they would apply
with even greater force in relation to the problem now under review—“ The liability
4 “ of the Suez Canal to Blocking Attack in the event of war with Japan," for the
following reasons :—
(a.) Japan was not a signatory to the Suez Canal Convention, and the blocking
of the Canal even in peace time would cause her little inconvenience.
(5.) Japan would be unable to resist the temptation to interfere with the Suez
Canal in the event of war with this country.
* Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain Fiance, Italy. Holland, Kussia, Turkey.
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