Coll 30/9 'Persian Gulf: Administration Reports 1926-1938' [‎196v] (397/1028)

the* whole of Ins Northern friues from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. would
have “ gone up
6 . As usual however ihe Bedouin tribes could not co-operate, and each
wanted to wait and see what would happen in the South before deciding on any
thing.
7. Bin Sand sizing up the situation exactly, and having his finger on the
pulse of his tribes as ever, acted in masterly fashion, when he saw that his rush
down the coast to Kodeida had not succeeded in bluffing Yahya into swing for
peace. He declared himself anxious to end the bloodshed between the
“ Musalmeen ” and offered generous peace terms to Yemen.
8 . Bin Sand succeeded in impressing the world with his magnanimity, but
in no wise did he deceive his own people or tribes, who one and all recognized
that in doing as he did, he had saved himself and the house of Saud from
disaster.
9. Once again had the luck (hath) of the King come to his rescue.
10 . The Shaikh of Kuwait, who would have liked to have seen Bin Saud
suffer a mild defeat or as he pui it “ have some of the wind taken out of big
head ”, was not a little relieved that complete disaster had not overtaken tlw
King’s armies. For like everyone else in North East Arabia, he firmly believed
.that Bin Baud’s distant adventure was leading him straight to destruction.
11 . In this connection it should never be forgotten, that although Kuwait
hates Bin Sand for his local anti-Kuwait “ Blockade measures ”, she vet
admires and looks up to him, as the great champion of the Musalmeen in the
world today. In particular is he admired for the way he deals with the Euro-
pea?! powers, and keeps them all wooing him, yet never letting them get to near
or too familiar, lie is a second “ Saladin ” for the Arabs today.
Y7I .—Relations with Iraq.
1 . Officially these have been correct throughout the year, though unfortu
nately the dlst of December 19^1 saw the famous “ Date Gardens question”
still unsettled. One still hopes however that 1935 will see the end of the sad
business which has done so much to acerbate Kuwa't feebim against her
northern neighbour and to strain her old loyal and affectionate" feeling for the
British connection to near breaking point.
i n c \ e ^ a ^ 3 an 'i reports on the measures and counter measures taken by
both sides m the fight tor these gardens will be found elsewhere.
2 . 1934 saw' also the second “ big’ posh ” of the Iraq Government tin their
poh ical campaign against Kuwait) develop and come to a head. One refers
to ther: anti-smuggling ” attack.
— VT' alchi oi Persia, nacl raised her sea Customs tai
to such a dizzy height that smuggling was bound to occur on all her borders,
Kuwait with her low Customs tariff, fixed many years ago, to enable 1:
to compete with Bahrain, Dabai etc., in the common and natural desire to si;
ply the Bedouin wor d of Arabia with their wants, naturally became a che
<md sought-after market for the Iraq nomad population. These latter fiuanc
ami assisted by the river tribes of the Euphrates had found it clearlv to tin
a<h anfage during the existing hard times, to come down to Kuwait and do tin
shopping.
o. iiaq took ooiecnon to this and requested Kuwait to prevent
tribesmen entering Kuwait territory, or failing this, to accept an official (!
vhose pay would come from Iraq) to act as her Customs Director, whose 1
mss among or iers, would be to fix a trade quota of imports sufficient foi
needs ot the Kuwait population.
^ s 10 k J ^ s h e has just as much right to fry and develop
^ ' ail( m °agi e iiade with the outside world as her big neighbour has,
t0 B'N re ? ucst even if were Possible to do so. would
tantamount to asking her to commit political suicide.
5. Clearly Iraq’s honest and only course is to place a line of Customs ]
her 1 rentier, and by a system of tribal and police patrols to herself st»l
on