‘GAZETTEER OF PERSIA VOL. I Comprising the Provinces of ASTARÁBÁD, SHÁHRUD-BÚSTAN, KHÚRÁSÁN, AND SÍSTÁN’ [‎268r] (542/722)

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of a different character continue to offer to invaders long after their armies
have been defeated and their cities taken.
“ It continually occurs that the despotic monarchs of uncivilised countries
desire to have all the advantages of those permanent establishments, which
give prosperity and strength to a well-regulated government, and hope to
attain these, particularly a disciplined army, without any sacrifice of their
absolute power. These efforts to obtain objects which are incompatible may
succeed so far as to add, for the moment, to the internal tranquillity of the
country, by checking or subduing the turbulent spirit and ambition of
feudatory lords and their warlike followers ; but a total change of the
government itself must take place, before the new system of defence can
operate further than to paralyse the old. An army cannot possibly be
maintained in a state of discipline and efficiency for any length of time,
unless its pay be regular and all its equipments complete ; and this can
never be the case, except in a state where the succession to the throne is
settled, where the great majority of the population are of peaceable habits,
and where establishments are permanent, and the laws respected and admin
istered upon principles which are understood, and not liable to be altered
at the will of the sovereign, and those to whom he delegates his authority.
That a regular army may be instrumental, by the influence of its example
and habits of order, in promoting civilisation there can be no doubt; but
this change must coincide with many other reforms, or every effort
to render it effectual to the great object of national defence will be abortive
and terminate in disappointment.
“The reigning monarch of Persia has been disposed to try this system, by
an observation of the advantages which the Russians derived from their
discipline, and a belief that his subjects, if clothed, armed, and trained in
the same manner, would be more equal to a contest with that nation ; and
he has probably seen with satisfaction the growth of a force, which is also
calculated, from its formation, to increase his power over the more turbu
lent part of his own subjects. But it is perhaps fortunate for his kingdom
that this plan has not yet proceeded to an extent that can have seriously
injured either the feelings or the efficiency of that irregular army, to which
Persia must (while her government remains unaltered) trust principally for
her defence against the attack of any European power. The means which
this nation possesses to resist such an attack are far from inconsiderable ;
but they are of a character which would not be improved by the partial
introduction of a new military system. They consist chiefly of natural
obstacles, which nothing but a long period of time and many radical changes
could overcome. The great proportion of the inhabitants of this king
dom must be civilised before they could be subdued. Neither the soil nor
the productions of the country are of a nature to invite conquest; and its
internal condition connected with its relative position to the most warlike and
barbarous of all the nations of Asia would place the European state which
attempted that project in a situation of more difficulty and embarrassment
on the day that it was apparently accomplished than on that on which it was
commenced.
“ The French first introduced some military system into Persia. When
Napoleon the Great resolved to take Persia under his auspices, he despatched
several officers of superior intelligence to that country with the mission
of General Gardanne in 1808. These gentlemen commenced^ their oper
ations in the provinces of Azarbaijan and Karmanshah, and, it is said, with
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