‘GAZETTEER OF PERSIA VOL. I Comprising the Provinces of ASTARÁBÁD, SHÁHRUD-BÚSTAN, KHÚRÁSÁN, AND SÍSTÁN’ [‎245v] (497/722)

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with which that kingdom has been afflicted and under the worst princes,
more security, both in their persons and property, ihe reason is obvious :
their traffic is essential to the revenue. Oppression cannot be partially
exercised upon them; for the plunder of one would alarm all, confidence
would be banished, and trade cease. Besides, the merchants of Persia
correspond with those of the adjacent countries; and the king, who ventured
to attack this class, must consent to have his name consigned to disgrace
and obloquv in every quarter. „ , , ,.
The citizens of great towns, who have no further protection than what
they find in that respect which the absolute monarch of the country is
disposed to pay to law and usage, and to the character of their priests and
magistrates, are much more exposed to the effects of a tyrannical govern
ment than the wandering tribes, who constitute the military part of the
community in Persia, and whose condition in a very great degree protects
them from oppression. These tribes may, in fact, be consideied as a camp
of soldiers who are only exposed to the common vicissitudes of the military
life and who are formidable from the characters of that social union, which
causes them to entertain common feelings of attachment and of resentment.
The power of the monarch over this class of his subjects may be said to be
liable to the same fluctuations as that which he exercises over the principal
tributaries of the kingdom, whose submission or disobedience is always
determined by the weakness or strength of his authority. .
The kings of Persia are considered as completely absolute in all that
relates to their own family. They may employ their sons in the public
service, or immure them in a harem deprive them of sight, or of life, as
their inclination or their policy may dictate. It was the practice of the
Safavian kings, after the time of Shah Abbas the Great, to confine the
princes of the blood; and those not intended for the succession were usually
deprived of sight, that they might not have it in their power to disturb the
peace of the country. The successor to the throne, though fixed upon by
the king, was seldom declared till the moment of his elevation ; but the
rank of the mother was, according to the custom of that family, of no
consequence j and the son of a slave (if it suited the pleasure of his loyal
father) had as good pretensions to the crown as the descendant of the
highest born princess, who boasted the honour of marriage with the sovereign.
The reigning family of Persia have adopted usages more congenial to the
feelings of the military tribe to which they belong. _ A number of the sons
of the present monarch are employed in the chief governments of the
kingdom; and a prince, not the eldest of the king's sons, but whose mother
is of a high family in the Kajar tribe, has been declared the heir of the
crown, and has for many years enjoyed a consideration and exercised a
charge suited to his high destination. It appears, therefore, that there is
no fixed rule for the treatment of the princes of the blood royal in Persia;
but in all the periods the members of his family have been entirely depend
ent upon the monarch. Their condition is regulated by his feelings or his
policy ; and he is considered by his subjects to have even a more absolute
authority over them than over his domestics, courtiers, and ministers. The
sons of the ruler of Persia have, in fact, no rights that are either recognised
by law or by custom. No mediating power can interpose between them
and their parent and sovereign. Born on a precipice, they are every
moment in danger of destruction, and are alike subject to fall by their
virtues as their crimes. For the jealousy of a despot is excessive; and he