‘GAZETTEER OF PERSIA VOL. I Comprising the Provinces of ASTARÁBÁD, SHÁHRUD-BÚSTAN, KHÚRÁSÁN, AND SÍSTÁN’ [‎131r] (266/722)

of the men, and the fact that two or three deaths took place during my
short stay, gave evidence in support of it.
The present chief of Kalat, Bihbud Khan, is a man of about 50 years of
The chief of Kalat, Bihbud age, intelligent and very well informed, having an
Khan (1881). uncommon taste for study, both of the literature
and history of his own country and of foreign languages. These tastes
deprive an assumption of religious strictness of any taint of bigotry, and
render him better disposed towards Europeans than men in his position in
the country usually are. He is a son of Yalangtush Khan before mentioned,
and has suffered for the frequent rebellions and invariable contumacy of
his father by a lengthened exclusion from his patrimony and chiefship.
The Hissam-us-Sultanat* first recognized his abilities and restored to him
his father’s lands and the government of the impoverished and ruined chief-
ship, and he has since continued a devoted adherent of his first patron,
though under the present regime the connection is calculated rather to injure
his position and to render him an object of suspicion. He has incurred also
the enmity of the Khan of Daraghaz, his neighbour and rival; for the confid
ence reposed in him led to his being selected as the medium of communication
between the provincial government and the Turkumans of Marv and
entrusted with the task of resettling the Atak—a preferment that would
certainly, if the prince’s government had continued, have benefited him
greatly to the prejudice of his rival.
With the Turkumans the Khan maintains the most close and friendly
relations. The most direct route, though an impracticable one for military
or commercial purposes to Marv, lies through his country, and all commu
nications with the Marv chiefs pass through his hands.
During the governor generalship of the Hissam-us-Sultanat, who had
the wisdom to perceive that one of the first results of the Russian attack on
Khiva would be the severance of the ties that bound the Turkumans to the
Khanates, negotiations were carried on and overtures made to many of the
leading Aksakals of Marv, to induce portions of the tribe to return and
occupy, under the protection of Persia, their old seats on the Tajand and in
the Atak. This measure would have created a bond between Persia and
the Tekke tribe that could not have failed to bear important fruit, and
would at least have proved of value to Persia when the question of the pos
session of Marv came to be discussed between her and Russia. If the removal
of the prince had not nipped the project in the bud, and if it could have been
carried out in its integrity, there can be no doubt that a large fraction of
the Tekke would have been enlisted under the banner of Persia, and
a path would have been opened for the extension of her influence over
the whole tribe—an advantage that would have secured her a sound basis
for a claim to the sovereignty of the oasis.
Through the exertions of the Khan, a commencement was made by the
actual location of a number of Tekke in the Atak, and, so far as it went,
the arrangement appears to have given satisfaction to both parties. There
is no reason to doubt the probability of a successful prosecution of the scheme;
but, as I have related elsewhere, a change of government, and consequent
change of policy, ruined the one statesmanlike measure of border policy that
has been projected since the Asaf-ud-Daula’s efforts were brought to a con
clusion by his removal 30 years ago.
The Tekke were given just cause for renewed hostility ; and a feeble and
hopeless attempt was made to settle portions of the Atak from the
exhausted population of the adjoining Persian districts.
* Properly husdm, the ‘ sword.’