'File 5/193 II (B 38) Slavery in the Gulf' [‎11r] (26/475)

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opinion here, and I think that the Commissioner at Port Sudan would agree with
me that, in spite of the assurances given by the Italian Government, dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. ^s are still
leaving Massowah with pilgrims. The control of the dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. traffic is therefore
rendered so much the more difficult.
41. The work of the sloops is handicapped by the comparative ease with which
dhows can ply within the reef area north of Kamaran, which covers over 10,000
square miles, and in the many other waters where navigation is impeded .by reefs.
The commander of H.M.S. “ Dahlia " states in a report of his that no ships can
approach the Arabian coast in the Red Sea, even in daylight, except at a few well
charted places, and that no ships can approach it with safety at any point after
dark. One route only through the reef area north of Kamaran is known to
be adequately charted and passable for sloops, and that one only by daylight.
Whatever the odds normally in favour of the dhows may be, these are enormously
increased once they reach the reef areas, where the slave-runner can manoeuvre more
freely, and if he hugs the mainland can lie concealed in the inlets or run his dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean.
ashore and escape into the security of the desert on sighting a ship.
42. Another thing that detracts from the effectiveness of the patrol is the
impossibility, as things are at present, of obtaining reliable advance information
about the movements of slave dhows. No organised intelligence service exists, at
any rate on the Arabian side, through which such information might be obtained.
I gather that a somewhat ambitious proposal for something of this nature was
rejected in 1928 on the ground chiefly of expense. Personally, I find it well-nigh
impossible, without something more elaborate in the way of an intelligence service
than I have at present, to obtain any reliable information which would be of practical
assistance in leading to the capture of slave dhows. Add to this the fact, which is, I
think, established, that good workable arrangements exist by which slave traders are
apprised of the movements, and on occasion also of the intended movements of the
sloops, and it may well be conjectured how it has been possible to achieve any results
at all.
43. There is another difficulty which I would like to mention, although it has
already received consideration. It arises over the question of the sanctity of
territorial waters. According to present arrangements His Majesty’s sloops are
debarred from operating in the territorial waters of French Somaliland and Eritrea.
This embargo is a very real one, and experience has shown that any departure from
the punctilious observance of international custom in this respect at once evokes a
strong protest. I have already drawn attention to the illusory nature of the French
and Italian patrol of these waters. I do not think that it can be disputed that slave
dhows are practically free to sail northwards along the African coast without
interference until they choose their time for crossing. This is doubtless known to
the slave traders.
44. So far, I believe, no serious difficulties have arisen with the Hejaz or other
authorities over the question of the right of search of Arabian dhows whether on the
high seas or in territorial waters; as regards these latter, it is questionable wdiat
are territorial waters in the Red Sea, whether, that is to say, reef and island areas are
included. Some difficulty arose in the early part of last vear over the right of the
British sloops to call at Hejazi ports without obtaining previous permission,
notification of the expected visit alone having been given in the past. For a period
of the year it was considered advisable that the sloops should abstain from calling,
but the question is momentarily dormant. All these matters may require formal
settlement with the Hejaz Government at any time, but a discussion of them does
not fall within the scope of this memorandum. Nevertheless, I should like to record
my opinion that, setting aside the question of the French and Italian territorial
waters to which I have referred above, the exercise by the sloops of the right of
search in the Red Sea of dhows of all nationalities, whether on the high seas or in
territorial waters, is an essential factor in the suppression of the slave trade. To
abandon it would be to render the patrol entirely ineffective. It would be fatal, in
my opinion, to yield to a possible request of the Hejaz Government to do so, a request
which incidentally would raise the question of the treatment of all Arabian dhows
alike in this respect, as, failing similar treatment, all dhows engaged in slave running
would simply transfer to the Hejaz flag.
45. In connexion with the right of search, it is interesting to note that during
the last fourteen months out of 116 dhows examined only six were definitely proved
to be of Hejaz nationality, although another eight or nine were possibly Hejazi also.
[56 bb—1] ’ c