'Mesopotamia. Commission' [‎101v] (205/256)

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No. p.
('kief of (leucro! Staff. India, la Chief of Imperial Cm
iOtl, Itecember 1!U4.
i’ al Staff, War Office, dated
(Telegraphic.)
From information given bv three Turkish officers captureil on 7th Deeemiter at Me/m-a.
we gather that after the action of 4th December the Turks were reinforced by some infantry,
2 guns, 160 gunners and 200 sappers. The combined Turkish strength at Me/.era and Kurna
was about 3.000, and consisted of gendarmerie Depot battalion, and nine guns. Seven of the
latter have been disabled or captured. The Turkish garrison at Basra has mostly retired
towards Suk-es-Sliuvukh and Na/iriyah. The Turkish forces at Bagdad, when the above
prisoners left there about 25th November, consisted of 4 (iendarme battalions,! Nizam
battalion, 600 cavalrv, and some Held and mountain guns under the command of Abdul Hamid
Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. . Some guns and four battalions are said to be en route for Constantinople. One
battery, two battalions regulars, all 12th Army Corps, together with sonte Kurdistan
tribesmen, were also en route for Bagdad from Mosul. On 7th September a Division went to
the North from Bagdad. There is no lack of food or ammunition according to the prisoners
statement.
No. 'jl.
Ceueral Barrett to Secretanj of State for India, dated 1 \th l>ecemher DM 1.
(Telegraphic.)
10th December. 1,000 prisoners arrived from Kurna to-day and were placed on board ship.
No. f8.
\ *
Secret a ni of State for ludia\to I icenaj, dated 14/// December 1014.
(Telegraphic.)
Reference telegram of 10th instant from Chief ot Ceneral Staff. It may be expedient to
turn Turks out of Nasiriyah district, so please consider practicability of sending a force to
eject enemy and occupy district which blocks approaches from Bagdad by either right bank
Euphrates or Shat-el-Hai and which protects Muntafik Arabs from Turkish interference. I
understand that Suk-es-Shuyukh can be reached by water from Kurna in two or three days.
The occupation of triangle Basra-Kurna-Nasiriyah would give us complete control of all
approaches to Gulf and influence Arabs on both sides of Kuphmtes.
No.
Secretari/ of State for India to Viceroy, dated 16/// December 1914.
(Telegraphic.) ...
In vour telegram of the 5th instant regarding Basra.it is, presumed that you refer not
onlv to the town and its suburbs, but to the vilayet as well. It is the wish of His Majesty s
Government that no declaration may be made of permanent annexation. Such an act would
run counter to the principle that, pending a final settlement when the war is at an end. all
occupation by allies of territories conquered is provisional. Subject to the foregoing remark,
the proposals for temporary administration have my general approval. With reference' to the
departments mentioned in the second telegram from Sir 1\ Cox. it is desirable to retain, as
far as possible, the existing structure of local agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. and administration, and to observe
leniency in the collection of revenue. For the present uo attempt should be made to give the
form of an Indian district to the vilayet. With reference to officers in charge, the appoint
ments proposed for the present purpose are approved. For the time being control of the
administration will be vested in the Government of India. It is desirable to keep down the
European staff to the smallest dimensions possible, and no officer should receive a promise of
being employed permanently in Mesopotamia. Bhimf imv^. iiv the mmireM
Y.> ....w.t ill.' . if 111 III ini rri 111 inn 1 1 i il ii n 1 n r r nn m i n>r Wwr* m
pnl4ijc_xluH rn'ijniiu;i ^lini' 1,1 hr iiu*d
\'icerot/ to Secretary of State for India, dated '2nd January 1915.
(Telegraphic.) ....
Your teleo-ram dated 14th December, regarding occupation of Nasiriyiyh district,has been
considered, and up to the present our information is not sufficient to justify a Hnal decision.
We realise that a permanent’ occupationof Nasiriyah would consolidate our political position
south of Euphrates, but our information as to actual military value of the place is at present
scanty, and the question is complicated by recent reports from Egypt to the effect that the
Turkish troops from Mosul and Baghdad are-returning from Syria. This may lead eventually
to our having to face superior numbers in Mesopotamia, and as we have no troops available to
reinforce our Division there, we must be most careful not to disseminate our force without
strong military reasons, by pushing tfoops up to place, which, once occupied,nve cannot again
evacuate without great loss of prestige. aLo mraxt umue m* iNwmi m nh
tin rtfr 1 11 w a is L K 41^ Twrks-fo
*t“, we ftinudd Tftin f Vrst - try it?eef Hi it Suott^I be>tv
- exeite rel itfi
m*u-e fnn
»>ppt>siiliiU.
SbakehfHi**.r hhi-. a4kit.utU and -the iiiHu«iuio.Uo<4ian exeri, before committing
Barrett t»> a move on Mu nil iywh). Meantime, we are taking steps to obtain all information
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