'Mesopotamia. Commission' [‎83v] (169/256)

40
capture Baghdad, and at the same time take or destroy lurkish steamers am ot 1^1 m>,t >,
thus practically preventing any further attacks down stieam. But lie could no ■ leniam icie
exposed to attack by Turkish reinforcements from Mosul or Aleppo uit umt iimse )ein^
reinforced by one division of troops. It would be a grave jiolitical error ^ to a vance o
Baghdad, and to retire later under pressure from the lurks. Consequent 3 ., un ess i h
possible to reinforce Nixon from elsewhere other than from India, he must remain a ut e
Amara. On the other hand, from a political point of view, capture of llaghdat v\ou c ci ea e
an immense impression in Middle East, especially in Persia, Afghanistan, and on out 10,1 111 ’
and would counteract unfortunate impi’ession created by want of success in Dardane es.
would also isolate' German parties in Persia, probably produce pacificating effect in t mt conn 1 \,
and frustrate German plan of raising Afghanistan and the tribes, while impression thioug 1011
Arabia would be striking. In India effect would undoubtedly be good. Ihese aie
considerations to which I attach great importance, but I put them forward to be t\eig te n
you and His Majesty’s Government, for I fully realise that it is for His Majesty s Government
to decide where and how our forces can be used with the best possible effect.
No. 189.
Secretary of State for India to General hiixon, dated Sth October Idlo.
(Telegraphic.)
With what addition to your present force are you confident that you can both occupy
and hold Baghdad ? Reply direct and repeat reply to Government of India.
No. 190.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 8tk October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Private. Reference to my telegram of to-day to Nixon repeated to you. Cabinet are so
impressed with great political and military advantages of occupation of Baghdad that we
shall make every effort to supply necessary force. We do not wish to attempt it with
insufficient forces. Are you satisfied that one division is sufficient ?
No. 191.
General Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated 8th October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Your telegram of 8 th. I am confident that 1 can beat Nur-ed-din and occupy Baghdad
without anv addition to my present force. But if Turks should turn their serious attention to
the recovery of Baghdad and should send to Mesopotamia the large organised forces which
would be necessary for such an operation, then I consider that I should require one division
(and I should like also one white Cavalry Regiment) in addition to my present force to watch
both the Tigris and Euphrates lines of communication and defeat the enemy as he conies
within reach. Further, the Baghdad position would be best from which to do this.
Kut is 103 miles, and Townshend at Aziziyah is 48 from Baghdad by road.
No. 192.
General Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated 8th October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Enemy at Zeur reported reinforced. I have told Townshend that in view of enemy’s
more forward action 1 must leave measures to be taken to his discretion. Headquarters,
Cavalry Brigade, and half “ S ” Battery have reached him and Ifith Brigade with two more
field, one howitzer and one maxim battery, join him 9th. He has asked for 17th Brigade,
which has been despatched and should reach him 11 th.
No. 192".
Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 9t/t October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Private. Your private telegram of the 8 th instant and Nixon's telegram of the same
date. I am glad of the decision of Cabinet. After consulting the Commander-in-Chief, I
think that Nixon is in the best position to judge as to the number of troops required,
and when he mentions a division we understand him to mean a fully organised division
with its proper proportion of British troops and guns and its divisional Cavalry. In
addition to this he asks for a Cavalry Regiment. We are prepared to accept his opinion, but
think that it will also be necessary to insure that British units now with him are kept up to
strength by drafts from home, as India cannot supply these. We will keep the Indian units
full. We may add that reinforcing troops should reach Baghdad not later than one month
after its capture, as this is the period which we calculate must elapse before the Turks could
concentrate in strength to attempt its recapture.